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Tuesday, August 7, 2012

Protester

Michael C. Worsham v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2012-219 , Code Sec(s) 61; 6651; 6654; 6673; 7491.




MICHAEL CRAIG WORSHAM, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent .

Case Information: Code Sec(s): 61; 6651; 6654; 6673; 7491

Docket: Docket No. 31151-09.

Date Issued: 07/31/2012





HEADNOTE

XX.



Reference(s): Code Sec. 61; Code Sec. 6651; Code Sec. 6654; Code Sec. 6673; Code Sec. 7491



Syllabus

Official Tax Court Syllabus

Counsel

Michael Craig Worsham, pro se.

Marissa R. Lenius, Elizabeth S. Henn, Peter N. Scharff, and Tyler N. Orlowski, for respondent.



MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

GOEKE, Judge: By statutory notice of deficiency, respondent determined a $6,357 1 deficiency in petitioner's 2006 Federal income tax. Petitioner failed to file a 2006 Federal tax return. Respondent also determined a $1,430 addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1), 2 an $858 addition to tax under section 6651(a)(2), and a $301 addition to tax under section 6654(a). In an amendment to the answer to the petition, respondent asserted that the deficiency in tax was actually $67,298. In his amendment to answer respondent also asserted a $48,791 fraudulent failure to file addition to tax under section 6651(f), 3 as well as an increase of the section 6651(a)(2) addition to $16,825 and of the section 6654(a) addition to $3,185. The parties later stipulated certain amounts paid to petitioner during 2006, 4 as well as certain deductions. Finally, respondent filed a motion to impose sanctions against petitioner pursuant to section 6673(a)(1). The issues for our consideration are:



(1) whether petitioner failed to report taxable income of $193,026 for 2006. We hold that he did;



(2) whether petitioner is liable for the section 6651(f) fraudulent failure to file addition to tax for 2006. We hold that he is;



(3) whether petitioner is liable for the section 6651(a)(2) addition to tax resulting from his failure to pay the tax shown on a substitute for return (SFR) prepared by respondent. We hold that he is;



(4) whether petitioner is liable for additions to tax for failure to pay estimated taxes under section 6654 for 2006. We hold that he is; and



(5) whether to impose sanctions under section 6673 on petitioner for presenting frivolous or groundless arguments before the Court. We shall not.



FINDINGS OF FACT

At the time the petition was filed, petitioner resided in Maryland. Petitioner has a bachelor of science in chemistry, a master of science in civil engineering and a juris doctor from the University of Baltimore School of Law. He moved to Maryland in 1993 to work for the U.S. Army Environmental Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Over the next several years he attended law school at night, was sworn in as a member of the Maryland bar in 1998, and left the army in 2001 to start a solo law practice from his home. Petitioner's practice was not in the area of tax, and he did not take any tax courses in law school.



Petitioner filed a Federal tax return every year from 1989 (when he had just begun graduate school to earn his master of science in civil engineering) through 2004. On his 2004 Federal tax return petitioner reported $26,294 of adjusted gross income, $8,359 of taxable income, and $7,712 of self-employment income. 5 Petitioner's practice of law became more profitable during 2005. An accountant suggested petitioner incorporate his business for tax reasons, which he did, incorporating it under the name Michael C. Worsham, P.C. (Worsham, P.C.). During 2006 Worsham, P.C., had a corporate charter in effect in the State of Maryland, elected to be treated as an S corporation, and was wholly owned by petitioner.



Petitioner testified that during 2006 “without looking for it” he discovered information which led him to conclude that he was not required to file Federal tax returns or pay Federal income taxes. As a result, petitioner has not filed a personal Federal tax return for any year since 2004. 6 However, petitioner did make a $2,000 estimated tax payment to the U.S. Treasury for the 2005 tax year and also made a payment to the U.S. Treasury of $45,000 in April 2006, in connection with the filing of a Form 4868, Application for Automatic Extension of Time To File U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for 2005. The $45,000 payment was credited to petitioner's 2005 income tax account. 7 Petitioner did not make any payments with respect to his 2006 tax.



In payment for legal services petitioner performed, deposits totaling $192,410 were made to Worsham, P.C.'s business checking account during 2006. The parties stipulated that Worsham, P.C., incurred deductible expenses of $163,772 during 2006, including $118,000 in wages paid to petitioner. During 2006 petitioner also deposited $57,015 in settlement proceeds into a personal checking account. The proceeds were the result of personal lawsuits brought by petitioner in his own name. Finally, during 2006 petitioner made mortgage interest payments of $6,737, real property tax payments totaling $2,761, and charitable contributions of $840.



Before April 15, 2007, petitioner received three Forms 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income, reporting taxable payments of $20,000, $6,200, and $8,000 paid during 2006 to petitioner, Worsham, P.C., and the “Michael C. Worsham Trust Account”, 8 respectively. Each of these payments was the result of either compensation for legal services or settlement of a personal lawsuit (brought in his own name) and was not part of the amounts earned by petitioner or Worsham, P.C., previously discussed. Before April 15, 2007, petitioner also received a Form 1099- INT, Interest Income, prepared by Aberdeen Proving Ground Federal Credit Union reporting $961 of interest paid to petitioner on a personal account.



Using the information on the Forms 1099-MISC and Form 1099-INT (and not accounting for any deductions other than the standard deduction and one personal exemption as petitioner had not yet supplied information regarding home mortgage interest paid, property taxes paid, and charitable contributions made), respondent prepared an SFR for petitioner for 2006. This SFR showed tax due of $6,357. Respondent then issued a notice of deficiency to petitioner on September 28, 2009, determining a $6,357 deficiency in tax and the additions to tax described earlier.



After the petition was filed, respondent issued a subpoena duces tecum to each of petitioner's banks for statements of account for 2006. Respondent then performed bank deposits analyses for a Worsham, P.C. account at M&T Bank and petitioner's personal account at Aberdeen Proving Ground Federal Credit Union. As a result of the bank deposits analyses, respondent determined that petitioner's unreported income was substantially in excess of the amount determined in the notice of deficiency. We permitted respondent to amend the answer to assert an increased deficiency and to assert that petitioner is liable for the section 6651(f) fraudulent failure to file addition to tax.



After learning of the subpoenas duces tecum issued to his banks, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss seeking to have his case dismissed without prejudice. Petitioner mailed a letter to M&T Bank in which he stated: “Because I am dismissing this case, the Subpoena issued by the IRS to M&T Bank should no longer be valid, and M&T Bank should not be required to respond by producing copies of my account records.” Shortly after he mailed this letter to M&T Bank, we denied petitioner's motion to dismiss.



OPINION

I. Burden of Proof Generally, taxpayers bear the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the determinations of the Commissioner in a notice of deficiency are incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 [12 AFTR 1456] (1933). Petitioner has not argued that the burden of proof with respect to the deficiency determined in the notice of deficiency should shift to respondent. However, respondent concedes that he bears the burden of proof with respect to the increased deficiency asserted in the amendment to answer. See Rule 142(a). Respondent also bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the section 6651(f) fraudulent failure to file addition to tax applies. See sec. 7454(a). With respect to the additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654(a) determined in the notice of deficiency, respondent bears the burden of production. See sec. 7491(c). With respect to the additions to tax applicable to the increased deficiency asserted in the amendment to answer, respondent concedes he bears the burden of both production and proof. See sec. 7491(c); Rule 142(a). As discussed infra, we find that respondent has met any burden of proof (or production as the case may be) he bears with respect to each issue.



II. Whether Petitioner Failed To Report Taxable Income of $193,026 for 2006



Section 1 imposes a Federal income tax on the taxable income of individuals. Taxable income is defined as gross income minus any allowed deductions. Sec. 63. Gross income is defined as all income from whatever source derived. Sec. 61(a). Section 61(a) specifically includes in the definition of income wages and compensation for services, including fees, and interest. Settlement proceeds are included in the broad definition of income under section 61(a) unless they are damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness. Sec. 104(a)(2); Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 328-329 [75 AFTR 2d 95-2675] (1995).



During 2006 petitioner received significant wages, compensation for legal services, settlement proceeds from personal lawsuits, and interest but chose to neither report these amounts nor pay any Federal income tax on them. Petitioner does not dispute that he received the amounts in question; indeed, he stipulated their receipt. Rather, petitioner makes a series of arguments that he owed no Federal taxes on his earnings during 2006.



In his posttrial brief petitioner argues that: (1) “there is no constitutional basis for federal taxes on the ordinary labor of a working American like Petitioner”; (2) “there is no federal statute that *** establishes federal tax liability for money earned from the ordinary labor of Americans”; and (3) respondent has failed to account for the basis value of a person's labor which “would be valued at near or the same as the value of the gross receipts which that same labor generated”. Petitioner has previously raised other issues, including: (1) “Respondent mislead [sic] Petitioner and others into believing that a Form 1040 [U.S. Individual Income Tax Return] was the only acceptable return” and that petitioner should not be liable for additions to tax because “Petitioner has not been given any or reasonable notice of a return or form to be filed other than Form 1040”; (2) “Whether *** the Fifth Amendment may apply to Petitioner and the demands made upon Petitioner by Respondent”; (3) issues relating to internal revenue districts; (4) whether certain withholding actions taken by respondent were unlawful without an assessment and proper notice; (5) whether the Tax Court has jurisdiction to determine constitutional issues related to income tax determination and the statutory basis for the same; 9 (6) “whether a [Tax Court] Judge can preside over and rule in a case where constitutional issues are inexorably linked to and required for resolution of that case, given the conflict between the Court's limited constitutional jurisdiction and that Judge's sworn requirement as” a member of a State bar association to support and defend the Constitution; and (7) that Form 1040 violates the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520. , 1207 (3d Cir. 1977); Hawkins v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-181 [TC Memo 2003-181] (”Petitioners contend that only a court established under Article III of the Constitution, rather than a legislative court established under Article I of the Constitution, can adjudicate the [constitutional] issues they have raised. Petitioners' arguments have no merit.” (Fn. ref. omitted.);Broughton v. Commissioner T.C. , Memo. 1979-77 (”in many cases involving various claims we have ruled *** that the income tax is a constitutional tax, that the provisions for a determination of deficiency by respondent are constitutional, [and] that this Court is a constitutional court”).



We decline the invitation to address in detail petitioner's numerous arguments. Courts confronting frivolous “tax protester” 10 arguments regarding the



Federal income tax often quote Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417, 1417 [54 AFTR 2d 84-5698] (5th Cir. 1984), which stated: “We perceive no need to refute these arguments with somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent”. Addressing frivolous tax-protester arguments: (1) wastes the limited resources of the Court; (2) delays the assessment of tax; and (3) risks dignifying such arguments or suggesting that they have some colorable merit. Wnuck v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 498, 510-513 (2011). We have also recognized that tax-protester arguments: (1) are unlimited;



(2) may have little actual importance to those making them; (3) have already been answered; and (4) are patently frivolous. Id. at 501-505. Finally, we have noted that litigants who press frivolous tax-protester arguments often fail to hear their refutation. Id. at 504-505.



Petitioner repeatedly claims his arguments are not frivolous, but we disagree. Regarding petitioner's constitutional arguments, courts have previously stated that “The constitutionality of our income tax system—including the role played within that system by the Internal Revenue Service and the Tax Court—has long been “Persons who make frivolous anti-tax arguments have sometimes been called `tax protesters'.” Wnuck v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 498, 502 n. 2 (2011). established.” Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d at 1417 [54 AFTR 2d 84-5698]-1418; see also Powers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-229 [TC Memo 2009-229]; DiCarlo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-280 [1992 RIA TC Memo ¶92,280]. We therefore hold these constitutional arguments are frivolous.



Petitioner's argument that no Federal statute imposes a tax on a person's ordinary labor relies on selective and misguided readings of multiple statutes. Petitioner's argument that he had a basis in his labor is also frivolous. Courts have clearly held that the statutory law does impose a tax on payments for a person's ordinary labor and that taxpayers have no basis in their labor supplied. Howard v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-222 [TC Memo 2000-222] (taxpayer claimed that payments for his labor were not income and that he had a basis in his labor equal to the amount of the payment received for it; we stated that “All of these arguments have been consistently rejected by the courts and can be accurately characterized as timeworn protester type rhetoric.”); see also Rowlee v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1111, 1113, 1119-1121 (1983); Hyslep v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-289 [¶88,289 PH Memo TC]; Cornell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-370 [¶83,370 PH Memo TC]. We therefore find these arguments are frivolous.



The arguments not already addressed were not argued in petitioner's posttrial brief and were either not well developed or not developed at all. We will not address them other than to say: “The short answer to all of petitioner's arguments is that he is not exempt from Federal income tax.” Martin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-560 [¶90,560 PH Memo TC] (citing Abrams v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 403, 406-407 (1984)).



One final argument by petitioner relating to the deficiency 11 that we will fully address relates to the cases respondent cites in his opening brief. Petitioner claims that Tax Court opinions filed before September 25, 2005, are not available through searches on the Tax Court's Web site, and respondent has cited several such older cases in his brief without providing petitioner with copies of those cases. Petitioner argues that “in fairness *** [we] should not consider arguments based on these older cases that are not available to Petitioner in a publicly accessible database.” In support of this argument, petitioner cites rule 32.1(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides that “If a party cites a federal judicial opinion *** that is not available in a publicly accessible electronic database, the party must file and serve a copy of that opinion *** with the brief or other paper in which it is cited.”



We disagree with petitioner. Rule 1(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that “These rules govern procedure in the United States courts of appeals.” The Tax Court is not an appellate court, and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure therefore do not apply to cases disputed herein. In addition, the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure contain no similar rule regarding cases not available on a public database.



Having found all of petitioner's arguments to be frivolous or inapplicable, we find that respondent has proved that petitioner failed to report taxable income of $193,026 for 2006 and is liable for the Federal tax he failed to pay on that income.



III. Whether Petitioner Is Liable for the Section 6651(f) Fraudulent Failure To File Addition to Tax for 2006



Section 6651(f) imposes an addition to tax of up to 75% 12 in the case of any fraudulent failure to file a tax return. Respondent has the burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing evidence. See sec. 7454(a); Rule 142(b). To satisfy the burden of proof, respondent must show: (1) an underpayment of tax exists; and (2) petitioner intended to evade taxes known to be owing by conduct intended to conceal, mislead, or otherwise prevent the collection of taxes. Clayton v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 632, 646 (1994); see also Sadler v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 99, 102 (1999); Parks v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 654, 660-661 (1990).



A. Underpayment of Tax The clear and convincing standard applies not merely to whether an underpayment is attributable to fraud, but also to whether an underpayment exists. Parks v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. at 660-661; Di Rocco v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-300 [TC Memo 2009-300]. Considering the facts and law discussed hereinabove, we find that respondent has proven by clear and convincing evidence that an underpayment of tax exists for 2006.



B. Fraudulent Intent The Commissioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a portion of the underpayment for each taxable year in issue was due to fraud. See Prof'l Servs. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 888, 930 (1982). The existence of fraud is a question of fact to be resolved upon consideration of the entire record. King's Court Mobile Home Park, Inc. v. Commissioner 98 T.C. 511, 516 (1992). The , taxpayer's entire course of conduct may establish the requisite fraudulent intent. Stone v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 213, 223-224 (1971). Because direct proof of a taxpayer's intent is rarely available, fraud may be proved by circumstantial evidence and reasonably inferred from the facts. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 [30 AFTR 378] (1943); Niedringhaus v. Commissioner , 99 T.C. 202, 210 (1992); Rowlee v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. at 1123.



Petitioner has argued that although he failed to file his 2006 tax return, his failure to file was not fraudulent because he had a good-faith belief that he was not required to pay Federal tax on the amounts he earned. Petitioner's argument is similar to the argument made by the taxpayer inRowlee v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. at 1123-1124. In that case we found that the taxpayer's failure to file was fraudulent, stating:



Failure to file tax returns, without more, is not proof of fraud; such omission may be consistent with a state of mind other than the intention and expectation of defeating the payment of taxes. ***



Failure to file, however, may be considered in connection with other facts in determining whether any deficiency or underpayment of tax is due to fraud. *** Here, there is no question that *** [taxpayer's] purpose was to avoid, and not merely to postpone, the payment of taxes that he claims he was not obligated to pay. On the basis of the entire record, the failure to file must be viewed as conduct intended to conceal *** [taxpayer's] noncompliance with the law. The burden on respondent to both locate and assess a delinquent taxpayer is, in a sense, greater than the verification of items reported on a return that has been filed but may be false. And, as stated in Helvering v. Mitchell, *** [303 U.S. 391, 401 [20 AFTR 796] (1938)], it is that necessity for which the Government is to be compensated by the addition to tax. [Taxpayer] contends that he could not have intended to conceal his conduct because of his attempts to confront various agents of respondent. But those attempts *** occurred long after the time for filing his returns had passed. *** [Taxpayer] cannot disregard the laws that have been passed by Congress and upheld by the courts; fail to perform an affirmative duty imposed upon him by those laws; proclaim, only when he has been discovered, that those laws are inconsistent with his or another's philosophy; and then expect to avoid the consequences of his avowedly freely exercised disobedience. [Citations and fn. refs. omitted.] Certain indicia, commonly known as badges of fraud, constitute circumstantial evidence which may give rise to a finding of fraudulent intent. Bradford v. Commissioner, 796 F.2d 303, 307 [58 AFTR 2d 86-5532] (9th Cir. 1986), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1984-601 [¶84,601 PH Memo TC]. “Although no single factor is necessarily sufficient to establish fraud, the existence of several indicia is persuasive circumstantial evidence of fraud.” Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 661, 700 (1989). As discussed below, several badges of fraud are applicable in this case.



Failure to file a tax return is a badge of fraud and “An extended pattern of failing to file income tax returns *** may be persuasive circumstantial evidence of fraud.” DeVries v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-185 [TC Memo 2011-185] (citing Marsellus v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 883, 885 [39 AFTR 2d 77-595] (5th Cir. 1977), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1975-368 [¶75,368 PH Memo TC])); see also Bradford v. Commissioner, 796 F.2d at 307. In addition, when failure to file is viewed in the light of the previous filing of tax returns for prior years, the nonfiling “weighs heavily against” the taxpayer because it demonstrates the taxpayer's awareness of the filing requirement. Castillo v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 405, 409 (1985). Petitioner filed a Federal tax return every year from 1989 through 2004 but has not filed a tax return since. We find that petitioner's pattern of failing to file tax returns after 2004 is persuasive evidence of fraud, especially when viewed in the light of his prior tax return filings and failure to make estimated tax payments. See Niedringhaus v. Commissioner 99 T.C. at 213 (”We find that petitioner's , failure to file returns, combined with his failure to make estimated tax payments, was a deliberate attempt to conceal his correct tax liability and to frustrate its collection.”) (citing Miller v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 316, 337 (1990)).



Petitioner argues that he stopped filing tax returns only upon discovering information in 2006 which led him to conclude that he was not required to file tax returns or pay taxes. We believe it more likely that petitioner stopped filing tax returns because of his larger tax burden resulting from the increasing profitability of his law practice.



Petitioner also argues that the years 1993 through 2001 are irrelevant because he was required to file returns and pay Federal income tax for those years as a Federal employee in the army. We have previously noted that the theory that only Federal employees are subject to Federal income tax “is a common, frivolous, tax-protester argument” of no merit. Hamilton v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2009-271 [TC Memo 2009-271] (fn. ref. omitted).



While tax-protester arguments may not be evidence of fraud by themselves, they may be indicative of fraud if made in conjunction with affirmative acts designed to evade Federal income tax. DeVries v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-185 [TC Memo 2011-185] (citing Kotmair v. Commissioner 86 T.C. 1253, 1260-1261 (1986)). In , the instant case petitioner has raised a multitude of frivolous, tax-protester arguments in conjunction with the failure to file a tax return or make estimated tax payments. Petitioner has also engaged in affirmative acts (relating to the subpoenas duces tecum) designed to evade Federal income taxes, as described infra. We therefore find petitioner's tax-protester arguments are indicative of fraud.



A taxpayer's education, training, business experience, and knowledge of income tax laws are relevant in deciding whether a taxpayer committed fraud. Drobny v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1326, 1349 (1986); Harker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-583 [1994 RIA TC Memo ¶94,583], aff'd, 82 F.3d 806 [77 AFTR 2d 96-2081] (8th Cir. 1996). Petitioner is a highly intelligent individual with graduate degrees in both engineering and law. He is an accomplished businessman and attorney, having formed his own successful law practice which he incorporated as an S corporation for tax reasons after an accountant suggested doing so. Although he does not practice in the area of tax, nor did he take any tax courses in law school, petitioner has the intelligence and ability to recognize the frivolous, incorrect, and completely discredited nature of the arguments he has made in support of his failure to pay Federal taxes or file a Federal tax return. We find these facts are further evidence of fraud.



In addition to the previously described facts, we also note that after learning of the subpoenas duces tecum issued to his banks petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, seeking to have his case dismissed without prejudice. After filing the motion to dismiss, petitioner mailed a letter to one bank in which he stated: “Because I am dismissing this case, the Subpoena issued by the IRS to M&T Bank should no longer be valid, and M&T Bank should not be required to respond by producing copies of my account records.” Essentially, once petitioner knew respondent was about to discover the true amount of income he received during 2006 he sought to avoid the consequences by paying only the smaller deficiency and additions to tax originally determined by respondent. We believe these facts are evidence that petitioner was more concerned with trying to conceal the true amount of income he received than with presenting good-faith (but misguided) arguments regarding his Federal tax liability and duty to file a Federal tax return.



Considering the evidence, we find respondent has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the underpayment for 2006 was due to fraud. As we have previously found, respondent has proved that an underpayment of tax existed for 2006. Petitioner is therefore subject to the section 6651(f) fraudulent failure to file addition to tax for 2006.



IV. Whether Petitioner Is Liable for the Section 6651(a)(2) Addition to Tax for 2006



Section 6651(a)(2) imposes an addition to tax for any failure to pay the tax shown on a return on or before the date prescribed for payment. The addition is equal to 0.5% of the amount shown as tax on the return for each month, or fraction thereof, during which the failure to pay continues, up to a maximum of 25%. Sec. 6651(a)(2). The addition will not apply if it is shown that the failure to pay timely was due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. Id. A failure to pay is due to reasonable cause if the taxpayer “exercised ordinary business care and prudence in providing for payment of his tax liability and was nevertheless either unable to pay the tax or would suffer an undue hardship *** if he paid on the due date.” Sec. 301.6651-1(c)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs.; see also Ruggeri v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-300 [TC Memo 2008-300]. Willful neglect contemplates “a conscious, intentional failure or reckless indifference.” United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 245 [55 AFTR 2d 85-1535] (1985).



Under section 6020(b)(1), when a taxpayer fails to make any return required by law, the Commissioner “shall make such return from his own knowledge and from such information as he can obtain through testimony or otherwise.” Under section 6651(g)(2), any return so prepared by the Commissioner shall be treated as the taxpayer's return for purposes of section 6651(a)(2). Respondent prepared such a return in this case which showed that petitioner owed $6,357 in tax before the addition of interest and additions to tax. 13



Petitioner has not paid any portion of the amount reported due on the return respondent prepared. Petitioner did not demonstrate reasonable cause for failing to pay. Rather, petitioner intentionally chose not to file and pay tax for 2006, making a variety of frivolous tax-protester arguments. Frivolous positions do not constitute reasonable cause for failure to timely pay tax due. McGowan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-154 [TC Memo 2006-154] (”Misguided interpretations of the Constitution or other typical tax protester arguments are not reasonable cause.”). As a result, we find that petitioner failed to timely pay the tax shown due on the section 6020 return without reasonable cause and is liable for the addition to tax under section 6651(a)(2).



V. Whether Petitioner Is Liable for the Addition to Tax for Failure To Pay Estimated Tax Under Section 6654 for 2006



Respondent determined an addition to his calculation of tax liability for 2006 for failure to pay estimated tax. Section 6654(d)(1)(B) provides that a taxpayer's required annual payment is limited to the lesser of 90% of the tax shown on the return for the taxable year (or, if no return is filed, 90% of the tax for such year), or 100% of the tax shown on the return of the individual for the preceding taxable year. 14 Petitioner did not address this issue but has argued that he had no tax liability for 2006. We have already found that petitioner was liable for tax for 2006. Therefore, petitioner is liable for the section 6654 addition to tax. The amount of the addition shall be determined by the parties in their Rule 155 calculations in accordance with the other holdings herein.



VI. Section 6673 Sanctions Respondent filed a motion requesting that the Court impose sanctions against petitioner pursuant to section 6673(a)(1). Section 6673(a)(1) authorizes the Court to require a taxpayer to pay a penalty to the United States in an amount not to exceed $25,000 whenever it appears to the Court that the taxpayer instituted or maintained the proceeding primarily for delay or that the taxpayer's position in the proceeding is frivolous or groundless.



Petitioner has taken a multitude of frivolous and groundless positions characteristic of tax protesters. However, considering the facts of this case, 15 we decline to impose sanctions against petitioner, although we strongly warn petitioner that making such arguments before this Court in the future will likely result in the imposition of sanctions against him.



VII. Conclusion We find petitioner failed to report taxable income of $193,026 for 2006 and is liable for the related deficiency. Further, we find petitioner liable for an addition to tax under section 6651(f), as well as additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(2) and 6654. However, we choose not to impose sanctions against petitioner under section 6673.



In reaching our holdings herein, we have considered all arguments made, and, to the extent not mentioned above, we conclude they are moot, irrelevant, or without merit.



To reflect the foregoing,



An appropriate order and decision will be entered under Rule 155.

1





All dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.

2



Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for 2006, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

3



Because of the sec. 6651(f) fraudulent failure to file addition to tax he now seeks against petitioner, respondent is seeking imposition of the sec. 6651(a)(1) addition to tax only as an alternative should we not hold petitioner liable for the fraudulent failure to file addition.

4



Petitioner disputes that these amounts constituted taxable income paid to him.

5



In the five tax years from 2000 to 2004 the highest amount of Federal tax petitioner paid in any one year was $6,185 for 2000.

6



Petitioner also did not file a Federal tax return on behalf of Worsham, P.C., for tax year 2005 or 2006.

7



Petitioner testified that for 2005 he paid more in tax than he actually owed.

8



No information was provided about this trust or trust account.

9



For jurisdictional purposes we note that the Tax Court is a constitutional court with the power to address constitutional issues raised before it. See Cupp v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 68, 84 (1975), aff'd without published opinion, 559 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir. 1977); Hawkins v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-181 (“Petitioners contend that only a court established under Article III of the Constitution, rather than a legislative court established under Article I of the Constitution, can adjudicate the [constitutional] issues they have raised. Petitioners' arguments have no merit.” (Fn. ref. omitted.); Broughton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1979-77 (“in many cases involving various claims we have ruled *** that the income tax is a constitutional tax, that the provisions for a determination of deficiency by respondent are constitutional, [and] that this Court is a constitutional court”).

10



“Persons who make frivolous anti-tax arguments have sometimes been called 'tax protesters'.” Wnuck v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 498, 502 n. 2 (2011).

11



This argument, as well as our response, is also applicable to the other issues considered in this opinion.

12



In this case the addition to tax is 75% of the underpayment of tax.

13



Respondent concedes that the sec. 6651(a)(2) addition to tax is not applicable to the increase in the deficiency later asserted because that increase was never shown on a tax return prepared by or for petitioner.

14



Petitioner did not file a 2005 Federal tax return.

15



We note that this is the first time petitioner has made such frivolous arguments before this Court.



Tuesday, July 24, 2012

Acknowledgment

Gayle O. Averyt and Margaret F. Averyt, et al. v. Commissioner., U.S. Tax Court, CCH Dec. 59,121(M), T.C. Memo. 2012-198, T.C.M. , (Jul. 16, 2012)


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Gayle O. Averyt and Margaret F. Averyt, et al. v. Commissioner.

U.S. Tax Court, Dkt. Nos. 18034-10, 18035-10, 18036-10, 18037-10, TC Memo. 2012-198, July 16, 2012.


Paul George Topolka and William Marion Wilcox IV, for petitioners; Randall L. Eager, Jr. and David M. McCallum, for respondent.

GAYLE O. AVERYT AND MARGARET F. AVERYT, ET AL., 1  Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WELLS, Judge: The instant case is before the Court on respondent's motion for summary judgment and petitioners' cross-motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 121. 2  Respondent determined deficiencies with respect to petitioners as follows:





Petitioners 2002 2004 2005 2006

Averyt — $92,774 $132,404 $70,143

Cassels ($96,836) — 384,720 —

Gaughf — 42,707 12,488 71,643

Lumpkin — 148,132 71,847 16,755

The issue we must decide is whether petitioners have satisfied the substantiation requirements of section 170(f)(8) with respect to the contribution of a conservation easement through their limited liability company, Cook's Mountain Timber, LLC (CMT).

Background

The facts set forth below are based upon examination of the pleadings, moving papers, responses, and attachments. Petitioners were all residents of South Carolina at the time they filed their petitions.

During all relevant periods, Gayle O. Averyt, William T. Cassels, Jr., J. Paul Gaughf, and John H. Lumpkin, Jr. (petitioner members), were members of CMT. 3  CMT had two other members who are not parties to the instant case. On December 29, 2004, CMT conveyed a conservation easement to Wetlands America Trust, Inc. (WAT), on 1,092.069 acres of land it owned in Richland County, South Carolina. WAT is a tax-exempt organization that was founded in 1985 to expand the mission of Ducks Unlimited, Inc. (DU), to protect wetlands. DU is the sole member of WAT, and WAT operates as a fiduciary for DU and manages its endowments.

The deed by which CMT conveyed the conservation easement to WAT (conservation deed) includes, inter alia, the following statements about the transfer of the conservation easement:

WHEREAS, Grantor and Grantee recognize the natural, scenic, aesthetic, and special character and opportunity for enhancement of the Protected Property, and have the common purpose of the conservation and protection in perpetuity of the Protected Property as “a relatively natural habitat of fish, wildlife or plants or similar ecosystem” as that phrase is used in 26 USC 170(h)(4)(A)(ii) and Section 170(h)(4)(A)(ii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (“the Code”), and in regulations promulgated thereunder by placing voluntary restrictions upon the use of the Protected Property and by providing for the transfer from the Grantor to the Grantee of affirmative rights for the protection of the Protected Property; and so as to qualify as a contribution of a “qualified conservation contribution” as that term is defined under Section 170(h)(2)(C) of the Code * * *

* * * * * * *

NOW, THEREFORE, the Grantor, in consideration of the foregoing recitations and of the mutual covenants, terms, conditions and restrictions hereinunder set forth and as an absolute and unconditional gift, subject to all matters of record, does hereby freely give, grant, bargain, donate and convey unto the Grantee, and its successors and assigns, the Easement over the Protected Property subject to the covenants, conditions and restrictions hereinafter set forth which will run with the land and burden the Protected Property in perpetuity.

* * * * * * *

Entire Agreement. This instrument sets forth the entire agreement of the parties with respect to the Easement and supercedes all prior discussions, negotiations, understandings, or agreements relating to the Easement, all of which are merged herein. * * *

The conservation deed includes a detailed description of the conservation easement's restrictions, WAT's rights pursuant to the easement, and the rights reserved to CMT. Additionally, the conservation deed includes a description of the property on which CMT placed the conservation easement. The conservation deed was executed on various dates during December 2004 by all of the members of CMT, including petitioner members. The conservation deed was also executed by James West, WAT's assistant secretary. The conservation deed was recorded on December 30, 2004.

During 2004, in addition to the conservation easement contributed to WAT through CMT, petitioner members separately each donated $6,250 in cash to DU. 4  The conservation deed makes no reference to those separate donations.

On February 10, 2005, DU mailed to each petitioner member a letter acknowledging its receipt of the conservation easement and his individual cash contribution of $6,250. Those letters are substantially identical and state, with respect to the contributions:

On behalf of Ducks Unlimited, I would like to personally thank you for your recent donation of a conservation easement on Cooks [sic] Mountain. We are grateful for the opportunity to protect a vital piece of South Carolina's Lowcountry wildlife habitat through this easement. I would also like to acknowledge your gift of $6,250 to the Ducks Unlimited Lowcountry Initiative Endowment. Per your request, this gift will be recognized as a Life Sponsorship under Mark R. Hoover. I will be sending your son a Life Sponsor pen and pendant from this office. Your gift will enable us to uphold the legal obligation to protect and maintain your conservation easements [sic] in perpetuity.

On February 28, 2005, DU mailed petitioner members another letter correcting the letter of February 10, 2005. Those letters stated:

I want to offer an apology for a recent administrative error. Brett Baker dictated two letters to me on February 10th, both pertaining to recent endowment gifts. The other easement donor had requested that his endowment gift be credited as a Life Sponsorship under his son's name. I mistakenly put that sentence in the wrong letter and my error did not get noticed until we were actually filing the letters.

Please accept my apology for this mistake. The endowment gift associated with Cooks [sic] Mountain will not be recognized as a Life Sponsorship to Mark R. Hoover as your letter had stated.

Aside from the quoted material, none of the letters discussed whether petitioner members received any goods or services in exchange for their contributions.

On or about April 1, 2005, CMT timely filed its 2004 Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income. On its return, CMT reported charitable contributions of $5,496,000, which was the appraised value of the conservation easement donated to WAT. The value of the conservation easement donation passed through to each of CMT's members, and petitioner members claimed pro rata shares of the deduction on their individual returns, which they filed jointly with their respective spouses, who are also petitioners in the instant case.

Respondent selected petitioners' tax returns for examination and, on May 18 and 19, 2010, issued notices of deficiency to petitioners. On August 11, 2010, petitioners timely filed their petitions in this Court.

Discussion

Rule 121(a) provides that either party may move for summary judgment upon all or any part of the legal issues in controversy. Full or partial summary judgment may be granted only if no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and the issues presented by the motion may be decided as a matter of law. See Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), aff'd, 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994).

As a general rule, a charitable contribution of $250 or more must be substantiated with a contemporaneous written acknowledgment from the donee organization. Sec. 170(f)(8)(A). The contemporaneous written acknowledgment “‘need not take any particular form. Thus, for example, acknowledgments may be made by letter, postcard, or computer-generated forms.’” Schrimsher v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-71 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rept. No. 103-213, at 565 n.32 (1993), 1993-3 C.B. 393, 443). Section 170(f)(8)(B) provides that the contemporaneous written acknowledgment must include the following information:

(i) The amount of cash and a description (but not value) of any property other than cash contributed.

(ii) Whether the donee organization provided any goods or services in consideration, in whole or in part, for any property described in clause (i).

(iii) A description and good faith estimate of the value of any goods or services referred to in clause (ii) * * *

Section 170(f)(8)(C) defines a “contemporaneous” acknowledgment as one received on or before the earlier of: (i) the date on which the taxpayer files a return for the year when the contribution was made; or (ii) the due date for that return, including any extensions.

Section 170(f)(8)(D) provides that the requirement of a contemporaneous written acknowledgment does not apply if the donee organization files a return, on a form and in the manner regulations may prescribe, which includes the information described in subparagraph (B). Additionally, section 170(f)(8)(E) authorizes the Commissioner to prescribe appropriate regulatory exceptions to “some or all” of the requirements of section 170(f)(8). Pursuant to that authority, the Commissioner has issued regulations providing that goods and services “are disregarded” for purposes of section 170(f)(8) if they have “insubstantial value” under guidelines provided in Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471, Rev. Proc. 92-49, 1992-1 C.B. 987, and any successor documents. Sec. 1.170A-13(f)(8)(i)(A), Income Tax Regs. Those guidelines provide that benefits received in exchange for a payment to a charity will be considered to have insubstantial value if both of the following requirements are satisfied: (1) the payment occurs within the context of a fundraising campaign in which the charity informs patrons how much of their payment is a deductible contribution; and (2) either (a) the fair market value of all of the benefits received is the lesser of 2% of the donor's payment or (for tax years beginning in 2004) $82, or (b) the payment is (for tax years beginning in 2004) $41 or more and the only benefits received are “token items”. Rev. Proc. 90-12, sec. 3.01, 1990-1 C.B. at 472; Rev. Proc. 2003-85, sec. 3.22(2), 2003-2 C.B. at 1189.

Section 170(f)(8) provides that no deduction shall be allowed unless the contribution is substantiated in accordance with the terms of that section. Congress enacted the substantiation requirements of section 170(f)(8) because many organizations were failing to inform donors that portions of the amounts donors paid to those organizations were not deductible because they were part of quid pro quo exchanges. See Addis v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 528, 536 (2002), aff'd, 374 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2004); H.R. Rept. No. 103-111, at 783, 785 (1993), 1993-3 C.B. 167, 359, 361. “The deterrence value of section 170(f)(8)'s total denial of a deduction comports with the effective administration of a self-assessment and self-reporting system.” Addis v. Commissioner, 374 F.3d at 887. The doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply to excuse compliance with the substantiation requirements of section 170(f)(8)(B). 5  Durden v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-140.

Petitioners contend, inter alia, that the February 10, 2005, letters satisfy the requirements of section 170(f)(8)(B)(ii) and (iii) because they state that DU provided petitioner members' sons with pens and pendants in recognition of petitioner members' gifts. Petitioners further contend that, because the February 10, 2005, letters state that petitioner members' sons received pens and pendants, it would have been untrue for those letters to state that petitioner members received no goods or services in consideration for their contributions. Because the pens and pendants had only nominal value, petitioners contend that pursuant to section 1.170A-13(f)(8)(i)(A), Income Tax Regs., Rev. Proc. 90-12, supra, and Rev. Proc. 92-49, supra, they should be disregarded for purposes of determining whether petitioner members' contributions satisfied section 170(f)(8). Petitioners' contentions regarding the February 10, 2005, letters lack merit.

Firstly, the parties are in agreement that petitioner members' sons never received pens and pendants and that, as clarified in the February 28, 2005, letters, the portion of the February 10, 2005, letters referring to those items was inaccurate.

Secondly, even if petitioner members' sons had received pens and pendants as stated in the February 10, 2005, letter, the letters do not comply with the requirements of Rev. Proc. 90-12, sec. 2.05, 1990-1 C.B. at 472, which states:

The Service has determined that a benefit may be so inconsequential or insubstantial that the full amount of a contribution is deductible under section 170 of the Code. Under the following guidelines, charities offering certain small items or other benefits of token value may treat the benefits as having insubstantial value so that they may advise contributors that contributions are fully deductible under section 170.

As explained above, the guidelines in Rev. Proc. 90-12, sec. 3.01(1), require that the payment occur “in the context of a fund-raising campaign in which the charity informs patrons how much of their payment is a deductible contribution”. (Emphasis added.) Because the February 10, 2005, letters from DU failed to inform petitioner members how much of each payment was a deductible contribution, even had the payment occurred in the context of a fundraising campaign the letters would fail to satisfy the requirements of Rev. Proc. 90-12, supra. Accordingly, we conclude that the February 10, 2005, letters fail to satisfy the requirements for a contemporaneous written acknowledgment pursuant to section 170(f)(8) and Rev. Proc. 90-12, supra.

Alternatively, petitioners contend that the conservation deed constitutes a contemporaneous written acknowledgment that complies with the requirements of section 170(f)(8). In Simmons v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-208, aff'd, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011), we considered a similar argument and held that the deeds in that case satisfied the substantiation requirements of section 170(f)(8). 6  The Court noted that the deeds were signed by a representative of the donee organization, were contemporaneous with the donation, and described the easement donated. Id. Similarly, in the instant case, the conservation deed was signed by a representative from WAT, provided a detailed description of the property and the conservation easement, and was contemporaneous with the contribution. Additionally, the conservation deed in the instant case states that the conservation easement is an unconditional gift, recites no consideration received in exchange for it, and stipulates that the conservation deed constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the contribution of the conservation easement. Accordingly, the conservation deed, taken as a whole, provides that no goods or services were received in exchange for the contribution. Consequently, we conclude that, as in Simmons, the conservation deed in the instant case satisfies the substantiation requirements of section 170(f)(8).

Respondent contends that the instant case is more analogous to Schrimsher v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-71, in which the Court held that the taxpayers’ contribution of a conservation easement was not deductible because the taxpayers did not receive a contemporaneous written acknowledgment from the donee organization. In Schrimsher, the deed recited as consideration “the sum of TEN DOLLARS, plus other good and valuable consideration”. Because that deed included no description and good faith estimate of the value of the “other good and valuable consideration”, the Court concluded that it failed to satisfy section 170(f)(8)(B)(ii) and (iii). However, we conclude that the instant case is distinguishable from Schrimsher because the conservation deed in the instant case states that the contribution of the conservation easement is made “in consideration of the foregoing recitations and of the mutual covenants, terms, conditions, and restrictions hereinunder set forth”, which include recitations of the property's conservation value but include no consideration of any value besides the preservation of the property, states that the easement is an “absolute and unconditional gift”, and provides that the conservation deed constitutes the entire agreement between the parties regarding the contribution of the conservation easement. Accordingly, we reject respondent's argument.

Respondent also contends that the Court's holdings in two recent cases, Friedman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-45, and Hollingsworth v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-262, are incompatible with petitioners' contention that the conservation deed may serve as a contemporaneous written acknowledgment. We disagree. Neither of those cases considered the question of whether a deed could serve as a contemporaneous written acknowledgment. Respondent emphasizes that both Friedman and Hollingsworth reiterate the necessity that the contemporaneous written acknowledgment state whether any consideration was received by the donors in exchange for the contribution. However, as we explained above, the conservation deed in the instant case states that the contribution was made as a gift and not for any consideration. Additionally, we note that Durden v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-140, does not support respondent's contention. Although we held in that case that the statute requires an “affirmative statement” regarding whether the donee organization provided any goods or services, we did not hold, and the statute does not require, that the statement take any particular form or contain any particular wording. We conclude that none of the cases 7  cited by respondent is incompatible with our holding in Simmons or with our holding in the instant case that a deed may serve as a contemporaneous written acknowledgment in accordance with section 170(f)(8) so long as it satisfies the requirements of the statute. Accordingly, we hold that petitioners have satisfied the requirements of section 170(f)(8) with respect to their donation of the conservation easement.

On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that petitioners are entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of whether they properly substantiated their contribution of a conservation easement to WAT with a contemporaneous written acknowledgment in accordance with section 170(f)(8). With respect to all other issues, we conclude that there are disputed issues of material fact that cannot be decided on motions for summary judgment.

In reaching these holdings, we have considered all the parties' arguments, and, to the extent not addressed herein, we conclude that they are moot, irrelevant, or without merit.

To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order will be issued.

Footnotes

1  Cases of the following petitioners are consolidated herewith for purposes of trial, briefing, and opinion: William T. Cassels, Jr., and Charlotte R. Cassels, docket No. 18035-10; J. Paul Gaughf and Holly S. Gaughf, docket No. 18036-10; and John H. Lumpkin, Jr., and Emily S. Lumpkin, docket No. 18037-10. We will hereinafter refer to these consolidated cases as the instant case.

2  Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

3  The unified audit and litigation procedures of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, sec. 401, 96 Stat. at 648, do not apply to CMT because it qualifies as a small partnership under sec. 6231(a)(1)(B)(i) and did not elect pursuant to sec. 6231(a)(1)(B)(ii) to have TEFRA apply. See Wadsworth v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-46.

4  It is unclear whether respondent allowed deductions for the $6,250 cash contributions. In any case, because petitioners did not raise the treatment of those deductions as an error in their petitions, we assume the parties are in agreement on the treatment of the cash contributions, and we will not address that issue herein.

5  As we noted in Durden v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-140, the doctrine of substantial compliance has been applied most often in cases involving procedural regulatory requirements. See, e.g., Bond v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 32, 41-42 (1993); Consol. Investors Grp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-158.

6  Although the Court in Simmons v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-208, aff'd, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011), held that the deed satisfied the sec. 170(f)(8) substantiation requirements, it did not specifically address the requirement that the written acknowledgment state whether the donee organizations provided any goods or services.

7  Respondent also cites Kendrix v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-9, Castleton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-58, aff'd, 188 Fed. Appx. 561 (9th Cir. 2006), Hill v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-156, and Stussy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-232. However, none of those cases supports respondent's position

Friday, July 6, 2012

Microsoft DC

MICROSOFT CORPORATION, INC. Petitioner v. OFFICE OF TAX AND REVENUE Respondent


Case Information:
Docket/Court: 2010-OTR-00012, District of Columbia Board of Tax Appeals
Date Issued: 05/01/2012
Tax Type(s): Corporate Income Tax

OPINION


REDACTED FINAL ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY DECISION


I. Introduction


NOTE: Due to a Protective Order entered in this case, a full version of this Final Order was filed under seal but issued to the parties subject to the Protective Order. Since the parties have not filed timely objections to the proposed redactions, this redacted version of this Final Order will be made publicly available.
A hearing was held on April 11, 2012, on a Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Petitioner Microsoft Corporation, Inc. (“Microsoft.”) Microsoft is appealing a February 5, 2010, Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax Deficiency for the 2005-06 tax year, in the amount of approximately $2.75 million, (the “Notice.”) Respondent District of Columbia Office of Tax and Revenue (“OTR”) issued the Notice, based upon a transfer pricing analysis conducted by Chainbridge Software, Inc. (“Chainbridge”). Chainbridge examined Microsoft's 2002 financial information, determined that Microsoft had underpaid its taxes for 2002 when it claimed a loss, and OTR applied the determination to 2005-06 when Microsoft carried the loss forward.
For the following reasons, I conclude that the transfer pricing analysis contained a fatal error. Chainbridge analyzed Microsoft's profit-to-cost ratio for the 2002 tax year and compared that ratio to the profit-to-cost ratios of . However, Chainbridge included all of Microsoft's income, without seeking to narrow its analysis to controlled transactions between Microsoft and its affiliated businesses, in violation of federal standards for transfer pricing analysis.
While the regulations allow some flexibility to the taxing authority to select the appropriate method, the application of the method chosen here does not comport with the purpose of the regulations. Chainbridge selected the comparable profits method set forth in 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-5. However, this regulation requires the analyst using the profit-to-cost method, to the extent possible, to compare controlled transactions (between the tested party and its affiliated businesses) against uncontrolled transactions made at arm's length with third parties. Chainbridge included all of Microsoft's transactions, whether controlled or uncontrolled, in the analysis of its profit-to-cost ratio, and Microsoft engaged in many uncontrolled transactions with third parties. In addition, Chainbridge failed to compare specific types of transactions conducted by Microsoft against comparable uncontrolled transactions. Therefore, Chainbridge's analysis cannot form the basis for a determination that OTR may reallocate income between Microsoft and its affiliated businesses to prevent an alleged or purported evasion of taxes.
On this basis, Microsoft has shown that the transfer pricing analysis is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable based on the undisputed facts in this case. D.C. Official Code §§ 47-4312 (review of tax deficiencies by OAH) and 47-1810.01 (the District's statute allowing transfer pricing analysis); 26 U.S.C. § 482 (the federal statute allowing transfer pricing analysis).
I conclude that there are no issues of material fact, and Microsoft is entitled to a decision in its favor as to its first ground for summary decision. OAH Rules 2819 and 2801.1; Superior Court of the District of Columbia Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 12-I(k) and 56; Kissi v. Hardesty, 3 A.3d 1125, 1128 (D.C. 2010) .
I must reverse the Notice issued on February 5, 2010. Nothing in this Order precludes OTR from issuing any additional notices of proposed tax assessments to Microsoft, consistent with all applicable laws.
I do not reach Microsoft's second ground for summary decision.

II. Background


This case arises under D.C. Official Code § 47-4312(a), and the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) Establishment Act, D.C. Official Code § 2-1831.03(b)(4). On March 8, 2010, Petitioner Microsoft Corporation, Inc., through its attorneys, filed its Taxpayer's Protest of a proposed assessment with the Office of Administrative Hearings. By electing a hearing with OAH, the taxpayer has waived the right to have this matter adjudicated in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. D.C. Official Code §§ 2-1831.030) and 47-4312(c).
Petitioner is appealing the Notice, issued by Respondent OTR on February 5, 2010. Respondent sought in the Notice to collect an alleged corporate franchise tax deficiency in the total amount of $2,746,344.00, plus interest and penalties, for the tax year ending June 30, 2006. For convenience, I have referred to this tax year as 2005.
According to Petitioner's taxpayer protest, Respondent disallowed the use of Petitioner's 2002 net operating loss (“NOL”) carryforward for the tax year ending June 30, 2006. Petitioner contends that Respondent has erroneously concluded that Petitioner's book income and tax income are materially different, Petitioner argues that Respondent's analysis of D.C, Official Code § 47-1810.03 is in error. Finally, Petitioner maintains that Respondent has failed to comply with applicable limitations periods in making an untimely adjustment to the 2006 tax return. 1
The basis for the Notice was a transfer pricing analysis conducted as to Petitioner's 2002 tax year, when it reported losses that were carried forward to future years, including 2005. Respondent contracted with ACS State and Local Solutions, Inc., (“ACS”) to provide the transfer pricing analysis, and ACS sub-contracted with Chainbridge. The central issue in this case is whether Chainbridge's transfer pricing analysis, which formed the basis for Respondent's Notice, (and Respondent's proposed assessment generally) was arbitrary, capricious, and/or unreasonable.
While the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has relied upon transfer pricing analyses to reallocate taxable income for many years, and federal statutes and regulations have been promulgated to govern the use of such analyses, see 26 U.S.C. § 482; 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.482-0 et seq., it appears that this is a relatively new practice and procedure for OTR. The District's comparable statute, D.C. Official Code § 47-1810.03, contains nearly identical language to that of the federal statute.
Because of the unusual basis for Respondent's action, and the fact that Respondent and its agents maintain most of the information necessary to understand their transfer pricing analysis, I have allowed extensive discovery not normally permitted in cases before OAH, including interrogatories and depositions.
The procedural schedule in this case, which has been amended from time to time, provided for a discovery phase, followed by a motions phase, and finally followed by a scheduled hearing.
Various rulings have been issued regarding discovery disputes that have arisen. I will not detail these disputes here, except to note that, on May 25, 2011, I issued a Protective Order prohibiting the public disclosure of certain information pertaining to Chainbridge's work product and processes. As a result, the parties have filed certain documents and portions of pleadings under seal, and have also provided redacted copies of the documents and pleadings for public viewing.
Pursuant to the procedural schedule, on December 23, 2011, Microsoft filed its Motion for Summary Judgment.
OTR requested that the discovery phase be reopened so that it could depose Microsoft's designated expert witness, David Guenther. That request was granted, and the deadlines for OTR's response and Microsoft's rebuttal were extended.
On March 29, 2012, OTR filed its Response. On April 5, 2012, Microsoft filed its Rebuttal.
A hearing was held on the Motion for Summary Judgment on April 11, 2012. Stephen Kranz, Esq., Diann Smith, Esq., and Wilson Barmeier, Esq., appeared on behalf of Microsoft. Edward Blick, Esq., Alan Levine, Esq., and Aisha Hashmi, Esq., appeared on behalf of OTR. Nancy Cook and Eric Cook, of Chainbridge, and their attorney, Helen Guyton, Esq., attended the hearing.
In the next section, Section III, I will summarize the parties' arguments. In Section IV, I will discuss the standard for motions for summary decision. In Section V, I will set forth the undisputed material facts. In Section VI, I will analyze the arguments of the parties. In Section VII, I will issue the order reversing the Notice.

III. The Parties' Arguments


Background: Chainbridge analyzed Microsoft by determining its profit-to-cost ratio in 2002, and comparing that profit-to-cost ratio to the profit-to-cost ratios of that were deemed to be similar to Microsoft (the “comparables”).
The objective is to place Microsoft in the same category as the corporations that are being compared to Microsoft, the comparables, so that the analysis compares apples to apples. This can be problematic because the financial information reported to various agencies can rely on different factual and accounting assumptions.
Based on this analysis, Chainbridge concluded that Microsoft was shifting income to avoid paying taxes in the District.

A. Microsoft's Motion


Microsoft moves for summary decision for two reasons.

First Ground - Improper Aggregation of All Transactions, Controlled and Otherwise.


Microsoft contends that, when Chainbridge determined the profit-to-cost ratio for Microsoft's 2002 transactions, Chainbridge improperly included all of Microsoft's transactions without first separating out the “controlled transactions” between Microsoft and its affiliated businesses. Microsoft contends that the federal regulations, and in particular several provisions of 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-5, require the analysis to be tailored to controlled transactions. Because Chainbridge calculated the profit-to-cost ratio for all transactions, the result is unreliable in determining whether Microsoft has improperly shifted income to avoid paying taxes.
Microsoft also contends that it conducts seven types of businesses, and that most of its income is derived from transactions with third parties. It argues that Chainbridge has improperly aggregated all of these transactions into one total number, whereas Chainbridge was required under the federal regulations to separate transactions based on the type.

Second Ground - Failure to Adjust for Two Factors.


Within Chainbridge's model, Microsoft argues that Chainbridge made two major adjustment errors when it tried to compare Microsoft's profit-to-cost ratio to those of
The first assigned error is that Chainbridge failed to deduct the costs of employee stock options that Microsoft offered its employees. The second assigned error is that Chainbridge failed to consider the unique problems created by the District's tax treatment of partnership income in a situation in which a related corporation and partnership both do business in the District. In 2002, Microsoft was affiliated with the partnership, MSLI, GP.
As to the second assigned error, the District taxes the partnership as an entity, instead of allowing the taxable income to pass through to the partners. Consequently, to avoid double taxation, the District allows the partners to deduct the partnership income that was subject to tax. Chainbridge had relied upon Microsoft's D20 tax form which included the deduction of the partnership income.
Microsoft contends that, in order to put Microsoft on the same footing as the comparables, Chainbridge was required to consider the profits and costs of the partnership as well.
Microsoft computes that, if the two assigned errors are corrected, Microsoft's profit-to-cost ratio jumps .
Microsoft states that it has many other objections to the analysis conducted by Chainbridge, but relies upon these two grounds for summary decision.

B. OTR's Argument


First Ground - The Narrowest Category is Microsoft's Gross Income


With regard to Microsoft's first argument, on improper aggregation of the income, OTR contends that Microsoft's business structure is so complex and entangled that the only proper way to analyze Microsoft's controlled transactions is to include all of the transactions. OTR notes that Microsoft has at least 100 affiliated businesses and that it has had thousands of intercompany transactions with those businesses. OTR relies on 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-l(f)(2)(i), which permits the aggregation of two or more transactions if the transactions are so interrelated that consideration of multiple transactions is the most reliable means of determining the arm's length consideration for the controlled transactions.
OTR claims that Chainbridge considered the arm's length transactions as well as the controlled transactions in analyzing Microsoft's income. OTR and Chainbridge concluded that the most narrowly identifiable business activity to determine the controlled transactions was the Gross Receipts line on Microsoft's D20 tax return.
Finally, OTR urges that Microsoft has an opportunity to misstate its income even as to uncontrolled transactions. On this basis, OTR urges that it is appropriate to look at the profit-to-cost ratio for the entire universe of transactions.

Second Ground - Concede Need for Adjustment in Part, but No Change in Result


As to the second argument, OTR has conceded that Chainbridge should have deducted the employee stock options costs. However, OTR contends that, if this adjustment is made, Microsoft's profit-to-cost ratio for 2002 only changes from to , which is still below the bottom of the interquartile range compared to the comparables. This adjustment does not change the proposed tax assessment at all.
OTR disagrees with Microsoft, however, about the proper treatment of the partnership income. According to OTR, the proper adjustment for the partnership income is to exclude it completely from consideration. The bases for OTR's position are that: (1) the partnership has already been taxed on that income; and (2) D.C. law does not permit consideration of the related partnership's income.

IV. The Standard for Summary Decision


OAH Rule 2819,1 permits a party to file a motion for summary adjudication, requesting that the administrative law judge decide the case summarily, without a hearing. Such a motion must include sufficient evidence of undisputed facts and citation of controlling legal authority.
OAH Rule 2801.1 provides that where a procedural issue is not specifically addressed in the OAH Rules of Procedure, an administrative law judge may be guided by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia Rules of Civil Procedure.
Microsoft has moved for a decision in its favor, under OAH Rule 2819. It has labeled its motion, a “Motion for Summary Judgment.” In support of the motion, it has also relied upon documents that are outside the scope of the pleadings. Therefore, it is more appropriate to consider the motion as akin to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, than a motion for dismissal. Compare D.C. Superior Court Rules 12-I(k) and 56 [summary judgment] with D.C. Superior Court Rule 12(b)(6) [dismissal for failure to state a claim].
Under Rule 56, the burden is on the moving party to show: (1) that there are no issues of material fact; and (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Kissi, 3 A.3d at ll28 .
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, resolving any ambiguities against the moving party. E.g., Young v. Delany, 647 A.2d 784, 788 (D.C. 1994) .
In this case, based on the uncontroverted facts, Microsoft's first ground for summary decision, that OTR and Chainbridge have improperly aggregated all of Microsoft's transactions, clearly has merit. Therefore, I will only discuss this ground for the remainder of this Order. It is not necessary to rule on the second ground.
Next, I will set forth the undisputed material facts. Then I will analyze the arguments.

V. Undisputed Material Facts


A. OTR's Selection of Chainbridge, and Chainbridge's Report


OTR is the taxing authority for the District of Columbia.
OTR has retained the services of ACS to conduct a transfer pricing analysis of Microsoft's 2002 income and expenses to determine whether Microsoft was underreporting its income to the District. ACS subcontracted this work to Chainbridge.
Chainbridge operates a business that, among other things, conducts transfer pricing analyses for various taxing authorities. Its principal owners/analysts are Nancy Cook and Eric Cook.
In July 2009, Chainbridge issued two documents based on its transfer pricing analysis, the “Economic Evaluation of the Arm's Length Nature of Intercompany Transactions between Microsoft Corporation and Related Parties for Tax Years 2005 through 2006,” (“2005 Report.”) and the “Economic Evaluation of the Arm's Length Nature of Intercompany Transactions between Microsoft Corporation and Related Parties for Tax Year 2002.” (the “Report.”) 2
OTR contracted for the transfer pricing analysis in large part because:


In the 2005 Report, Chainbridge concluded that Microsoft did not underreport its income for tax year 2005 (again, the tax year ending June 30, 2006).
In the Report, Chainbridge concluded that Microsoft underreported its income for tax year 2002. The remainder of the findings concern the bases for the Report and its findings and conclusions.

B. Chainbridge's Methodology


Chainbridge elected to conduct a comparable profits analysis comparing Microsoft's profit-to-cost ratio to those of comparables,



In determining Microsoft's income for 2002, Chainbridge chose to include all of Microsoft's income from any source. Chainbridge chose not to isolate controlled transactions between Microsoft and its affiliated businesses. The reasons for this decision were that Microsoft conducted thousands of transactions with its 100+ affiliated businesses, and that, based on this factor alone, Chainbridge concluded that the most narrowly identifiable business activity for which data incorporating the controlled transaction is available (relevant business activity), was the gross income amount reported by Microsoft on its D20 return. Chainbridge concluded that the federal regulations permitted it to aggregate all of Microsoft's transactions for the period in question, regardless of whether the transactions were controlled or not.
Chainbridge conducted what they viewed as an arm's-length analysis of all Microsoft's transactions by comparing the overall profit-to-cost ratio for all transactions to the corresponding ratios for the comparables. Chainbridge's principals have conceded that they included transactions between Microsoft and unrelated third parties. Microsoft Exhibits C (Deposition of Nancy Cook) p. 172; and D (Deposition of Eric Cook) pp. 172-73.
Chainbridge also did not seek to compare similar goods and services, but aggregated all transactions into one analysis. Chainbridge in its report identified seven types of product segments for Microsoft's business: However, Chainbridge deemed that all product segments were interrelated because collectively they constituted the business of computer software. Chainbridge Report, pp. 1-6.

C. Chainbridge's Initial Findings


In its Report, Chainbridge issued its findings based on its selected analysis.

Chainbridge chose to eliminate from consideration the outlier comparables, in the highest and lowest quartiles. Chainbridge considered the “interquartile range” to be the middle two quartiles. Since Microsoft's profit-to-cost ratio was outside the interquartile range of to , Chainbridge concluded that Microsoft was underreporting its income to the District in 2002, when it claimed an operating loss.

D. OTR's Notice


OTR relied upon Chainbridge's Report in disallowing Microsoft's carryforward of the NOL for the 2005 tax year. On this basis, on February 5, 2010, OTR issued the Notice seeking payment of a corporate franchise tax deficiency of $2,746,344, the entire amount of the carryforward claimed.

E. Adjustment to Chainbridge's Findings


Both OTR and Chainbridge have conceded that they should have deducted amounts for employee stock options paid by Microsoft in 2002 in considering its income, After accounting for this adjustment, Microsoft's profit-to-cost ratio changed to , which is still outside the interquartile range. OTR's Response, p. 11, Table 2.
This adjustment does not affect the overall conclusion of Chainbridge and OTR, that Microsoft underreported its income to the District in 2002. OTR Response, p. 12.

F. The Lack of Determination of Certain Facts


Because Chainbridge did not analyze such information, the record does not show: (1) what volume or dollar amount of controlled transactions Microsoft has conducted with its affiliated businesses; (2) what the profit-to-cost ratio Microsoft showed for controlled transactions; (3) what the profit-to-cost ratios the 21 comparables showed for arm's-length transactions; (4) what volume or dollar amount of transactions were conducted by Microsoft in its seven product segment categories; or (5) how the profit-to-cost ratios for Microsoft compared to those for the comparables in the specific product segments. 4
In 2002, Microsoft conducted business in the District, along with its partnership, MSLI, GP. Because Chainbridge and OTR do not agree to include partnership information from Microsoft's partnership in calculating the profit-to-cost ratio, the record does not show the profit-to-cost ratio of Microsoft and MSLI, GP, combined, for 2002. 5

VI. Analysis and Conclusions of Law


In this case, Microsoft carries the burdens of proof:
(1) To show that there are no disputes as to material fact, and that Microsoft is entitled to a decision in its favor as a matter of law; OAH Rules 2819.1 and 2801.1; Superior Court Rule 56; Kissi, 3 A.3d at 1128 ; and, ultimately,
(2) To show that OTR's Notice of a corporate franchise tax deficiency, based on a transfer pricing analysis conducted by Chainbridge, is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. Donahue v. District of Columbia, 451 A.2d 85, 86 fn.1 (D.C. 1982) [the burden of proof as to a tax assessment is on the taxpayer]; Altama Delta Corp. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 424, 458; 1995 U.S. Tax Court LEXIS 22; 104 T.C. No. 22 (April 11, 1995) [the burden of proof in a § 482 analysis case is on the taxpayer to show that the analysis was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable].

For the following reasons, I conclude that Microsoft has met these burdens with regard to one of the grounds for its Motion, i.e., that OTR and Chainbridge failed to conduct a comparable profits analysis of Microsoft's 2002 income based on applicable law because they improperly aggregated all of Microsoft's income, regardless of whether the income was derived from controlled or uncontrolled transactions.

A. OTR's Authority to Reallocate Income


D.C. Official Code § 47-1810.03 provides in pertinent part that, “In any of 2 or more organizations ... owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Mayor is authorized to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income or deductions between or among such organizations ..., whenever in his opinion such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations[.]”
The language of this statute is virtually identical to that of its federal counterpart, 26 U.S.C. § 482.
The District has not promulgated regulations to implement this statute. The parties agree that it is appropriate to look to the federal regulations, codified at 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.482-0 et seq., for guidance in interpreting the authority of OTR to rely upon “transfer pricing analyses” under D.C. Official Code § 47-1810.03. Indeed, Chainbridge, which has conducted many such analyses in the past ten years, specifically relied upon the federal regulations to support the methodology that it used.

B. General Requirements for Transfer Pricing Analysis - Measuring Controlled Transactions Against Arm's Length Standard


The general purpose for transfer pricing analysis, and for reallocation of income and deductions, is to “ensure that taxpayers clearly reflect income attributable to controlled transactions and to prevent the avoidance of taxes with respect to such transactions.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-l(a)(l).
Section 482 “places a controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer by determining the true taxable income of the controlled taxpayer.” Id.
In order to determine the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, “the standard to be applied in every case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm's length with an uncontrolled taxpayer. A controlled transaction meets the arm's length standard if the results of the transaction are consistent with the results that would have been realized if uncontrolled taxpayers had engaged in the same transaction under the same circumstances (arm's length result).” § 1.482-1(b)(1). 6
The federal regulatory scheme provides a number of methods that the taxing authority may select to measure the taxpayer's controlled transactions against the arm's length standard. §§ 1.482-2 through 1.482-7, and 1.482-9. The taxing authority is required to choose the best method that, “under the facts and circumstances, provides the most reliable measure of an arm's length result.” § 1.482-1(c)(1).
In order to determine whether a controlled transaction produces an arm's length result, the method used must measure against “results realized by uncontrolled taxpayers engaged in comparable transactions under comparable circumstances.” § 1.482-1(d)(1). This requires an analysis of all factors that affect comparability, including functions, contractual terms, risks, economic conditions, and property or services. Id. The uncontrolled transaction and the controlled transaction should be functionally comparable. § 1.482-1(d)(3).
This does not mean that the uncontrolled transaction must be identical to the controlled transaction but they must be “sufficiently similar that it provides a reliable measure of an arm's length result,” § 1.482-1(d)(2). The evaluator is required to adjust for material differences in the transactions. Id.
In analyzing the comparable transactions to be considered in the arm's length range, § 1.482-1(e)(2)(C) authorizes the evaluator to consider those results that are in the “interquartile range,” defined as the range from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile of the results derived from the uncontrolled comparables. This is the range that was employed by Chainbridge here.
The regulations allow aggregation of controlled transactions and uncontrolled transactions in limited circumstances:
The combined effect of two or more separate transactions (whether before, during, or after the taxable year under review) may be considered, if such transactions, taken as a whole, are so interrelated that consideration of multiple transactions is the most reliable means of determining the arm's length consideration for the controlled transactions. Generally, transactions will be aggregated only when they involve related products or services [.]

§ 1.482-1(f)(2)(i)(A).
Based on the results of a transfer pricing analysis, the taxing authority may reallocate income when “either by inadvertence or design the taxable income, in whole or in part, of a controlled taxpayer is other than it would have been had the taxpayer, in the conduct of its affairs, been dealing at arm's length with an uncontrolled taxpayer.” § 1.482-1(f)(1).
In this case, Chainbridge and OTR selected the comparable profits method, under § 1.482-5, as the best method to measure Microsoft's controlled transactions against the arm's length standard.

C. Comparable Profits Method Still Must Measure Controlled Transactions Against Arm's Length Standard


The purpose for the comparable profits method is to evaluate “whether the amount charged in a controlled transaction is arm's length based on objective measures of profitability (profit level indicators) derived from uncontrolled taxpayers that engage in similar business activities under similar circumstances.” § 1.482-5(a). The standard is “based on the amount of operating profit that the tested party would have earned on related party transactions if its profit level indicator were equal to that of an uncontrolled comparable (comparable operating profit).” § 1.482-5(b)(1).
In applying this method, the evaluator must select the “tested party,” which will usually be “the least complex of the controlled taxpayers,” and which “will not own valuable intangible property or unique assets that distinguish it from potential uncontrolled comparables.” Id.
As OTR notes, the arm's length range is “established using comparable operating profits derived from a single profit level indicator.” § 1.482-5(b)(3). However, OTR omits that the profit level indicator still is required to measure controlled transactions against uncontrolled transactions of a similar kind. § 1.482-5(b)(2) [“To the extent possible, profit level indicators should be applied solely to the tested party's financial data that is related to controlled transactions.”]
The same comparability factors listed generally in § 1.482-1, also apply to the comparable profits method. Section 1.482-5(c) contains many provisions that direct the evaluator to maximize the comparability of the controlled transactions and the uncontrolled transactions measured by the profit level indicator.
In this case, Microsoft contends that Chainbridge's decision to include all of Microsoft's income as the tested party for purposes of assigning a single profit-to-cost ratio was overbroad for two reasons: first, because Chainbridge failed to narrow the focus of its analysis to compare controlled transactions between Microsoft and its affiliated businesses to uncontrolled transactions conducted at arm's length; and second, because Chainbridge failed to compare Microsoft's specific product segment transactions to similar uncontrolled transactions. Both arguments have merit, and the first argument is particularly persuasive. I will address each point separately. 7

D. Chainbridge and OTR Failed to Measure Controlled Transactions Against Uncontrolled Transactions Conducted at Arm's Length


As the foregoing analysis shows, while the taxing authority has broad discretion to choose the appropriate method to determine whether the taxpayer's transactions meet the arm's length standard, the regulations clearly focus on an inquiry whether controlled transactions meet the arm's length standard. This focus permeates the regulations, including the regulation on comparable profits.
Microsoft made a prima facie showing in its Motion that the decision to include all of its income, controlled or not, on the tested party side of the analysis was overly broad and therefore inherently arbitrary. It was then incumbent on OTR to explain why it (or Chainbridge) decided to move from examining Microsoft's controlled transactions to examining all of its income.
According to OTR, its tax experts decided that the “most narrowly identifiable business activity for which data incorporating the controlled transaction is available,” under § 1.4 82-5 (b), was the gross income entry by Microsoft on its 2002 D20 tax return. This conclusion was not supported by any factors.
OTR then stated that Microsoft has engaged in thousands of controlled transactions with over 100 affiliated businesses, many of which were listed in the Report and in OTR's Response. However, the fact that Microsoft has 100 or even 2,000 affiliates does not address the question why there was no effort to isolate the controlled transactions. In other words, the inquiry goes to the transactions, and not to the number of affiliates. Neither OTR in its Response nor Chainbridge in its Report provides any insight as to why the entire income of Microsoft was selected.
OTR then cited § 1.482-l(f)(2)(i)(A), which authorizes the aggregation of two or more transactions, “if such transactions, taken as a whole, are so interrelated that consideration of multiple transactions is the most reliable means of determining the arm's length consideration for the controlled transactions.” But OTR provided no analysis why there was a need to aggregate transactions, and which transactions were aggregated. 8 Apparently, OTR simply decided to aggregate all of Microsoft's transactions, without inquiring as to whether the transactions were conducted with Microsoft's affiliates.
Although Microsoft did not specifically raise this issue, the record also shows that Chainbridge considered the entire income of the comparables and their affiliates without considering whether the profits and costs arose from controlled transactions. Thus, Chainbridge's framing of the data renders the analysis useless in determining whether Microsoft's controlled transactions were conducted in accordance with the arm's length standard. The analysis does not identify the tested party's controlled transaction profit-to-cost ratio, nor does it identify the comparables' uncontrolled transaction profit-to-cost ratio.
There is no need for a hearing on this issue because OTR and Chainbridge have conceded the facts that form the basis for Microsoft's Motion. Microsoft has proven that the transfer pricing analysis was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, because the analysis does not measure what the regulations require it to measure.

E. Chainbridge and OTR Failed to Measure Comparable Transactions


In addition, Microsoft's Motion has merit for the second reason advanced in its first argument: that Chainbridge failed to measure the profit-to-cost ratios of similar types of transactions.
As noted above, the regulations require that the transactions being compared must be functionally comparable. §§ 1.482-1(d)(1), 1.482-1(d)(3), and 1.482-5(c)(3)(iii) [requiring allocations of the costs, income, and assets between the relevant business activities and other activities].
OTR contends that Microsoft engages in one business: software. However, Chainbridge's Report shows that different types of business activities are identified for Microsoft, and yet Chainbridge made no effort to compare like kind transactions.
While § 1.482-5 generally allows some flexibility for the evamator to address the facts and circumstances of a particular case, there was no effort here to address any of the different types of transactions at issue. This is a significant error because the profit-to-cost ratio of uncontrolled transactions in may be Quite different than, for example, .
Without any differentiation of the comparable profits for different product and server lines, an overall profit level indicator is meaningless to indicate that Microsoft's controlled transactions do not meet the arm's length standard. For example, if one company conducts mostly one type of transaction that is very profitable, then its overall profit-to-cost ratio will most likely be higher than one that does not.
Again, there is no need for a hearing because OTR and Chainbridge have conceded that they failed to analyze the comparable profits of similar products or services. There is some discretion allowed in this area, but the analysis must attempt to address the purpose of the regulations.

Summary


For the reasons stated above, I conclude that there are no issues of material fact, and Microsoft is entitled to a decision in its favor as to its first ground for summary decision. OAH Rules 2819 and 2801.1; Superior Court of the District of Columbia Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 12-I(k) and 56; Kissi, 3 A.3d at 1128 .
While the regulations allow some flexibility to the taxing authority to select the appropriate method, the application of the method chosen here does not comport with the purpose of the regulations. Chainbridge selected the comparable profits method set forth in 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-5. However, this regulation requires the analyst using the profit-to-cost method, to the extent possible, to compare controlled transactions (between the tested party and its affiliated businesses) against uncontrolled transactions made at arm's length with third parties. Chainbridge included all of Microsoft's transactions, whether controlled or uncontrolled, in the analysis of its profit-to-cost ratio, and Microsoft engaged in many uncontrolled transactions with third parties. In addition, Chainbridge failed to compare comparable types of transactions conducted by Microsoft against comparable uncontrolled transactions. Therefore, Chainbridge's analysis cannot form the basis for a determination that OTR may reallocate income between Microsoft and its affiliated businesses to prevent evasion of taxes.
On this basis, Microsoft has shown that the transfer pricing analysis is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable based on the undisputed facts in this case. D.C. Official Code §§ 47-4312 and 47-1810.01 ; 26 U.S.C. § 482.
This decision only rules on the Notice at issue in this case. This Order does not preclude OTR from issuing any other tax assessment notices, subject to the provisions of applicable laws.

VII. Order


Upon consideration of Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment, Respondent's Response, Petitioner's Reply, and the entire record in this case, it is this 1 st day of May, 2012:
ORDERED, that Petitioner Microsoft Corporation, Inc.,'s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Notice of Proposed Tax Deficiency, issued by Respondent District of Columbia Office of Tax and Revenue on February 5, 2010, seeking to collect an alleged corporate franchise tax deficiency against Petitioner Microsoft Corporation, Inc., in the total amount of $2,746,344.00, plus interest and penalties, for the tax year ending June 30, 2006, is REVERSED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the appeal rights of any party aggrieved by this Order are stated below.
/s/

Paul B. Handy

Administrative Law Judge

After an administrative law judge has issued a Final Order, a party may ask the judge to change the Final Order and ask the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to change the Final Order. There are important time limitations described below for doing so.

HOW TO REQUEST THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE TO CHANGE THE FINAL ORDER


Under certain limited circumstances and within certain time limits, a party may file a written request asking the administrative law judge to change a final order, OAH Rule 2828 explains the circumstances under which such a request may be made. Rule 2828 and other OAH rules are available at www.oah.dc.gov and at OAH's office.
A request to change a final order does not affect the party's obligation to comply with the final order and to pay any fine or penalty. If a request to change a final order is received at OAH within 10 calendar days of the date the Final Order was filed (15 calendar days if OAH mailed the final order to you), the period for filing an appeal with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals does not begin to run until the Administrative Law Judge rules on the request. A request for a change in a final order will not be considered if it is received at OAH more than 120 calendar days of the date the Final Order was filed (125 calendar days if OAH mailed the Final Order to you).

HOW TO APPEAL THE FINAL ORDER TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS


Pursuant to D.C. Official Code § 2-1831.16(c)-(e), any party suffering a legal wrong or adversely affected or aggrieved by this Order may seek judicial review by filing a Petition for Review and six copies with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals at the following address:
Clerk
                    District of Columbia Court of Appeals
                          430 E Street, NW, Room 115
                             Washington, DC 20001

The Petition for Review (and required copies) may be mailed or delivered to the Court of Appeals, and must be received there within 30 calendar days of the mailing date of this Order, pursuant to D.C. App. R. 15(a)(2). There is a $100 fee for filing a Petition for Review. Persons who are unable to pay the filing fee may file a motion and affidavit to proceed without the payment of the fee when they file the Petition for Review. Information on petitions for review can be found in Title III of the Court of Appeals' Rules, which are available from the Clerk of the Court of Appeals, or at www.dcappeals.gov.
Certificate of Service:
By FAX & First Class Mail (Postage Paid):
Stephen P. Kranz, Esq.
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Washington, DC 20004
FAX: 202-640-0402
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I hereby certify that on May 1, 2012, copies of this document were caused to be served upon the above-named parties at the addresses listed and by the means stated.
/s/
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1

Microsoft later conceded that OTR was not barred by limitations from seeking the proposed tax deficiency, because the 2005-06 tax year was within the limitations period, even though OTR relied upon information from 2002.
2

For purposes of this Motion, 1 am considering the contents of the Report, which was filed with OAH under seal in July 2011. Both parties have made references to the Report, although neither party attached a copy of the Report to their respective pleadings. I conclude that the parties assume that the Report, which is the subject of this case, is in evidence for purposes of the Motion.
4

Microsoft asserted in its Motion that 98% to 99% of its transactions were conducted with third parties. When I asked Microsoft at the hearing to clarify where this percentage came from and what it means, Microsoft withdrew the assertion, stating that this was a figure provided by its expert, David Guenther, based on the volume of transactions and not the dollar amount. If the case were to proceed to a hearing, Mr. Guenther would presumably testify to the basis for this assertion. For purposes of resolving the Motion, I make no finding as to this fact. The pertinent fact, which OTR has conceded, is that Chainbridge analyzed all of Microsoft's income together and that this income included many transactions between Microsoft and unaffiliated third parties. This fact is sufficient to establish that the analysis was arbitrary when focusing on the inquiry required by 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.482-1 and 1.482-5.
5

Microsoft contends that this adjustment would raise its profit-to-cost ratio to because the partnership reported information that would create a much higher profit-to-cost ratio, but I must deem this fact to be in controversy since OTR and Chainbridge have not computed the ratio based on this contingency.
6

Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this analysis will refer to the Code of Federal Regulations Title 26.
7


8

OTR argued at the hearing that it was required to aggregate transactions to convert tax return data to financial data. This argument, however, does not address the larger problem that the aggregation of all transactions obscures the result, because the tested party's side of the equation was not limited in any way to controlled transactions.