Mark E. Stroff v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2011-80
This was a run of the mill substantiation case, with an unusual feature. The Tax Court went with the Service on disallowing many expenses but they allowed casual labor expenses to some extent with fairly minimal proof.
Self-employed handyman was granted partial Code Sec. 162 deduction of claimed “casual labor” expenses: although lacking any proof of actual amounts paid, taxpayer did submit list of laborers that corresponded with names entered in his weekly planner, which was enough to allow Tax Court to make Cohan estimate of deductible amount.
It wasn't a very large number or they probably would have allowed the expenses and gone after him for back-up withholding and 1099 filing penalties.
Andrew R. Bosque, et ux. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2011-79
There were a couple of issues in this case. One was the real estate professional issue which is starting to get really tedious. The main problem was substantiation of time spent. If you have another profession, I can't emphasize enough how important that is. The other was an attempt to double dip on the home office deduction. Interestingly they were allowed deduction for amounts paid to para-legals in husbands law practice. This strikes me as another case where I would be worried about 1099 penalties and back-up withholding.
Home office deductions—principal place of business—multiple businesses— double deductions. Attorney/real estate consultant and wife/nurse weren't entitled to home office deduction for husband's consulting business: deduction would amount to doublecounting because taxpayers had already taken home office deduction for same office space on husband's law practice business's Schedule C.
Attorney/real estate consultant and wife/nurse were denied deductions claimed on husband's consulting business's and law practice's Schedules C for rental or lease of business properties: taxpayers didn't offer any proof of those expenses. But, they were entitled to deduction for paralegal fees that were substantiated with check copies containing names of cases worked on, phrase “paralegal fees,“ and corroborative testimony.
Kurt Sollberger v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2011-78
One of my favorite comments on some schemes is "Sometimes you should just pay the taxes." Taxpayer had sold his closely held stock to an ESOP and purchased floating rate notes, which qualified for deferral. Then he met someone who "loaned" him 90% of the value.
Capital gains—deferred gain on sale of employer securities to ESOP; disposition of qualified replacement property; sale vs. loan. Manufacturing co. owner's transfer of floating rate notes to promoter of ostensible ESOP-QRP loan program was sale triggering deferred gain from prior ESOP stock sale: taxpayer's attempt to treat transfer as loan rather than sale was belied by evidence showing no material distinction between this and other sale cases wherein benefits and burdens of ownership clearly passed to promoter, which didn't then hold notes as collateral but rather immediately sold same and passed 90% of proceeds back to taxpayer.
Optech agreed under the MLSA to serve as the lender or as agent for another lender. The MLSA provided that petitioner, as the borrower, remained the beneficial owner of the FRNs posted as collateral during the term of the loan and the FRNs would not be subject to the claims of any of Optech's creditors. The MLSA stated, however, that the lender had the right to register the FRNs in the lender's name, and Optech could “assign, transfer, pledge, repledge, hypothecate, rehypothecate, lend, encumber short sell and/or sale” the FRNs during the term of the loan without notifying petitioner. Moreover, petitioner waived his rights in the MLSA to receive interest and other benefits from the FRNs during the term of the loan, and he could not prepay on the loan.
The question that intrigues me about this is what he did with the $900,000. If it was used for personal purposes then this deal would have been a bad deal even if it had worked since he would still be picking up the supposed interest on the notes, without having a corresponding deduction. Even if the interest was deductible as investment interest it still would not have been a wash because of the effect on AGI. Also even if the plan worked he was giving up something like half of his "savings" (and it was actually just a deferral) depending on what state he lived in.
IN RE: JOHNSON, Cite as 107 AFTR 2d 2011-XXXX
The whole discussion is a bit lawyerly for me, but the result is an important one. Inherited IRA's that were rolled over are exempt assets under federal bankruptcy law.
The Trustee, however, argues that the Inherited IRAs do not constitute “retirement funds” because they do not contain any contributions from the Debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(12), however, contains no such requirement. “ Section 522(d)(12) requires that the account be comprised of retirement funds, but it does not specify that they must be the debtor's retirement funds.” Nessa, 426 B.R. at 314. The plain language of a statute is determinative under federal law. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 757, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2246 (1992). By its plain terms, all that the Bankruptcy Code requires is that the funds at issue be retirement funds. Even though the Inherited IRAs do not contain the Debtor's own retirement funds, they were originally deposited by his parents as retirement funds and retained their status as such when properly transferred to the Debtor's account in compliance with the IRC.
I have shifted to Forbes.http://blogs.forbes.com/peterjreilly/ This site is an archive of my pre-July 2011 posts and a repository of original source material that I referenced from Forbes.
Showing posts with label bankruptcy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bankruptcy. Show all posts
Thursday, July 7, 2011
Wednesday, June 8, 2011
Wear That Badge of Fraud Boldly
The last of the tax season developments will be up soon. The purpose of this blog is to provide a little bit of analysis on developments that are otherwise largely ignored. This is by way of apologizing for the fact that these items are over two months old. If I think time is of the essence on a development I will move it to the head of the line and even make a bonus post. If you look at my blog roll you will find other bloggers who get to things more quickly than I do. If you prefer to get things really slow though you should subscribe to AICPA publications as I discussed in this post.
STROM v. U.S., Cite as 107 AFTR 2d 2011-XXXX
This was fairly interesting case about non-qualified stock options. Generally when non-qualified stock options are exercised the holder recognizes income based on the difference between the fair market value of the stock and the exercise price. The income recognition is deferred, though, if the holder is precluded from selling the stock under SEC regulations :
In this opinion, we first interpret the phrase “could subject a person to suit under section 16(b)” and determine what that phrase requires a taxpayer to demonstrate before she can postpone tax consequences under § 83(c)(3). We then hold that the taxpayer here has not demonstrated an entitlement to deferral of tax consequences under § 83(c)(3)
So long as the sale of property at a profit could subject a person to suit under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, such person's rights in such property are — (A) subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, and (B) not transferable.
This particular taxpayer did not qualify for the deferral.
Having established the standard for deferral of tax consequences under § 83(c)(3)—namely, a taxpayer must show that a § 16(b) suit premised on a sale of her stock would have had an objectively reasonable chance of success—we now turn to whether Strom has demonstrated that a sale of her InfoSpace stock could have subjected her to a § 16(b) suit meeting that standard.
To summarize our holdings: Under the SEC's interpretation of its rules, the vesting of Strom's unvested options did not constitute “purchases” under § 16(b). Thus, she is not entitled to defer the tax consequences of her option exercises under IRC § 83(c)(3), because she has not demonstrated that she could have been subject to a § 16(b) suit that had an objectively reasonable chance of success had she sold her stock at a profit in 1999 or 2000. A reasonably prudent and legally sophisticated person in Strom's position would have felt free to sell her property, because, if a § 16(b) suit had been brought against her, she would not have been forced to forfeit the profit obtained by the sale, nor would she have faced substantial legal expenses defending herself in a suit not readily dismissable.
Should any of these holdings appear anomalous, it is because § 83(c)(3)'s incorporation into the tax code of § 16(b) makes for strange bedfellows. The statutory and regulatory structures and purposes of the tax law and the securities law are distinct. In Strom's case, the interaction of the two statutory schemes means that she was not exposed to a realistic threat of forfeiting profits during the period when she was able to exercise options (and thereby incur tax consequences), because the period of concern for § 16(b) purposes had passed by then. There was therefore no overlap between the period of potential § 16(b) liability and the period Strom could incur tax consequences due to the options.
GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC v. U.S., ET AL., Cite as 107 AFTR 2d 2011-XXXX
This one is interesting more for the light it sheds on the mortgage crisis than anything else. A first mortgage on a property will have priority over subsequently filed federal tax liens. What happened here was that a mortgage discharge was accidentally recorded. Then the federal liens were recorded. The entity wants to reinstate the mortgage and have it be superior to the federal liens. The IRS argued that federal law prohibits that. The Court ruled that federal law does not not necessarily prohibit the restored mortgage gaining priority, but that under state law, New Hampshire, the servicer did not qualify for the relief.
This case raises several questions about the availability of equitable relief to restore a mistakenly discharged mortgage to a position of priority over subsequent federal tax liens. The plaintiff, Green Tree Servicing, LLC, claims that its predecessor erroneously recorded a discharge of its mortgage on a parcel owned by defendants Dana E. and Kristi L. Ricker, and seeks to restore that mortgage to its original priority over intervening liens filed by the Internal Revenue Service.
Green Tree further explains that, because the mortgage securing Conseco's first loan was never recorded, Conseco “inadvertently executed and recorded a satisfaction of the new mortgage” when, presumably, it was intending to record a satisfaction of its first mortgage instead. Curiously, though, this did not happen until May 24, 2002--despite the fact that the first Conseco loan was satisfied as soon as the second Conseco loan was made, on October 9, 2001 (more than 7 months earlier). 2 Furthermore, as the government points out, Green Tree explains the filing of the satisfaction differently in its complaint, which alleges that, after the loan was assigned from Conseco to Green Tree (which would not seem to have been necessary if, as Green Tree says, Conseco simply changed its name to Green Tree) Conseco “executed, in error, a satisfaction of mortgage, rather than an assignment of mortgage and caused [it] to be recorded” (quotation marks and capitalization omitted).
The government objects to this relief on two principal grounds. First, the government maintains that federal law, which, again, controls the priority of its liens here, does not allow the reinstatement of a discharged mortgage to a position of seniority over subsequently filed tax liens, regardless of whether state law would. Second, the government argues that, in any event, Green Tree has not demonstrated its entitlement to the equitable reinstatement of the mortgage under New Hampshire law. The court disagrees with the government's first point but agrees with its second point. As a result, Green Tree's motion for summary judgment must be denied.
IN RE: KRAUSE, Cite as 107 AFTR 2d 2011-XXXX
This was an appeal of a bankruptcy case where IRS liens were allowed against property transferred to a trust. I like some of the language which is why I am sharing some of it.
Can a taxpayer avoid the IRS by moving money to a “diet cookie” company and then destroying records that might show the company to be a sham? Or by transferring assets to his “children's trusts” only to use the trusts to pay for his country club membership, buy cars, and fund his lifestyle? The answer, of course, is no. Why this is so takes a bit more explanation.
To determine whether a conveyance is fraudulent and so void as a matter of state law, Kansas law directs us to look for “six badges or indicia of fraud”: “(1) a relationship between the grantor and grantee; (2) the grantee's knowledge of litigation against the grantor; (3) insolvency of the grantor; (4) a belief on the grantee's part that the contract was the grantor's last asset subject to a Kansas execution; (5) inadequacy of consideration; and (6) consummation of the transaction contrary to normal business procedures.” Koch Eng'g Co. v. Faulconer, 716 P.2d 180, 184 (Kan. 1986) (internal quotation omitted).
Mr. Krause wears these badges boldly. In setting up the “children's trusts,” he transferred money first to his wife who, in turn, transferred them to the trusts, all for no consideration. Mr. Krause also transferred various insurance policies to the trusts, again for no consideration. Each of these transfers took place after Mr. Krause knew the IRS was conducting an audit of his taxes and after the IRS issued a notice disallowing certain of his claimed losses. And while Mr. Krause's brother, Richard, served as trustee for the children's trusts, both he and Mrs. Krause have admitted that Mr. Krause controlled the assets in question at all times. Indeed, Mr. Krause maintained no personal bank account after 2000 but instead used the children's trusts to pay for his country-club memberships, car loans, and other personal expenses. And Mr. Krause did all this without objection from Richard, who candidly described his philosophy toward the trusts as “stick your head in the sand and then you don't know what is going on.” Aplt's App. vol. 1, at 300. In light of these remarkable and undisputed facts, badges of fraud all, it is plain that Mr. Krause remained the owner of the transferred assets; that the children's trusts held those assets simply as his nominees; and that those assets are subject to attachment by Mr. Krause's creditors under Kansas law.See also William D. Elliott, Federal Tax Collections, Liens and Levies ¶ 9.10[1] (2d ed. 2000) (“The subject of nominee liens refers to situations when taxpayer's property or rights to property is held in the name of another or transferred to another party.”).
U.S. v. SIMMONS, Cite as 107 AFTR 2d 2011-XXXX
This one has a really impressive number.
Joyce M. Simmons appeals the sentence imposed following her guilty plea conviction for six counts of preparation of false tax returns. The district court sentenced Simmons to the statutory maximum sentence of three years of imprisonment on each count, and it ordered that the sentences would run consecutively for a total of 216 months. It also ordered Simmons to pay $28,261,295.08 in restitution to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
The evidence in the pre-sentence report (PSR) and the testimony of IRS Agent Shannon Dawson established the method by which the estimated tax loss was calculated. While Simmons correctly states that the forty-one tax returns investigated by Agent Dawson were not a completely random sample, the record does not indicate that those returns would have a higher falsity rate than any other returns prepared by Simmons. Moreover, the PSR correctly noted that Agent Dawson's calculation was conservative because she used the lower of two reasonable falsity percentages that she calculated from the investigated sample, and she did not include any tax loss from approximately 3,000 tax returns prepared by Simmons that did not include a Schedule C.
Simmons next argues that the district court erred by applying an enhancement for her utilizing sophisticated means during the offense. She contends that the means she utilized were not sophisticated and that an enhancement for use of a special skill pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 should not have applied because she received an enhancement for being in the business of preparing tax returns. She asserts that the enhancement was not appropriate because a sophisticated means enhancement was not applied in United States v. Poltonowicz, 353 F. App'x 690 [104 AFTR 2d 2009-7564] (3d Cir. 2009), even though the defendant in that tax preparation fraud case had previously worked as an analyst for the IRS criminal investigation division.
Other than that she was appealing the length of her sentence. While I sometimes find that stuff interesting I'm not going into it any further. I was disappointed that there was not more explanation of the scam that she was running.
STROM v. U.S., Cite as 107 AFTR 2d 2011-XXXX
This was fairly interesting case about non-qualified stock options. Generally when non-qualified stock options are exercised the holder recognizes income based on the difference between the fair market value of the stock and the exercise price. The income recognition is deferred, though, if the holder is precluded from selling the stock under SEC regulations :
In this opinion, we first interpret the phrase “could subject a person to suit under section 16(b)” and determine what that phrase requires a taxpayer to demonstrate before she can postpone tax consequences under § 83(c)(3). We then hold that the taxpayer here has not demonstrated an entitlement to deferral of tax consequences under § 83(c)(3)
So long as the sale of property at a profit could subject a person to suit under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, such person's rights in such property are — (A) subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, and (B) not transferable.
This particular taxpayer did not qualify for the deferral.
Having established the standard for deferral of tax consequences under § 83(c)(3)—namely, a taxpayer must show that a § 16(b) suit premised on a sale of her stock would have had an objectively reasonable chance of success—we now turn to whether Strom has demonstrated that a sale of her InfoSpace stock could have subjected her to a § 16(b) suit meeting that standard.
To summarize our holdings: Under the SEC's interpretation of its rules, the vesting of Strom's unvested options did not constitute “purchases” under § 16(b). Thus, she is not entitled to defer the tax consequences of her option exercises under IRC § 83(c)(3), because she has not demonstrated that she could have been subject to a § 16(b) suit that had an objectively reasonable chance of success had she sold her stock at a profit in 1999 or 2000. A reasonably prudent and legally sophisticated person in Strom's position would have felt free to sell her property, because, if a § 16(b) suit had been brought against her, she would not have been forced to forfeit the profit obtained by the sale, nor would she have faced substantial legal expenses defending herself in a suit not readily dismissable.
Should any of these holdings appear anomalous, it is because § 83(c)(3)'s incorporation into the tax code of § 16(b) makes for strange bedfellows. The statutory and regulatory structures and purposes of the tax law and the securities law are distinct. In Strom's case, the interaction of the two statutory schemes means that she was not exposed to a realistic threat of forfeiting profits during the period when she was able to exercise options (and thereby incur tax consequences), because the period of concern for § 16(b) purposes had passed by then. There was therefore no overlap between the period of potential § 16(b) liability and the period Strom could incur tax consequences due to the options.
GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC v. U.S., ET AL., Cite as 107 AFTR 2d 2011-XXXX
This one is interesting more for the light it sheds on the mortgage crisis than anything else. A first mortgage on a property will have priority over subsequently filed federal tax liens. What happened here was that a mortgage discharge was accidentally recorded. Then the federal liens were recorded. The entity wants to reinstate the mortgage and have it be superior to the federal liens. The IRS argued that federal law prohibits that. The Court ruled that federal law does not not necessarily prohibit the restored mortgage gaining priority, but that under state law, New Hampshire, the servicer did not qualify for the relief.
This case raises several questions about the availability of equitable relief to restore a mistakenly discharged mortgage to a position of priority over subsequent federal tax liens. The plaintiff, Green Tree Servicing, LLC, claims that its predecessor erroneously recorded a discharge of its mortgage on a parcel owned by defendants Dana E. and Kristi L. Ricker, and seeks to restore that mortgage to its original priority over intervening liens filed by the Internal Revenue Service.
Green Tree further explains that, because the mortgage securing Conseco's first loan was never recorded, Conseco “inadvertently executed and recorded a satisfaction of the new mortgage” when, presumably, it was intending to record a satisfaction of its first mortgage instead. Curiously, though, this did not happen until May 24, 2002--despite the fact that the first Conseco loan was satisfied as soon as the second Conseco loan was made, on October 9, 2001 (more than 7 months earlier). 2 Furthermore, as the government points out, Green Tree explains the filing of the satisfaction differently in its complaint, which alleges that, after the loan was assigned from Conseco to Green Tree (which would not seem to have been necessary if, as Green Tree says, Conseco simply changed its name to Green Tree) Conseco “executed, in error, a satisfaction of mortgage, rather than an assignment of mortgage and caused [it] to be recorded” (quotation marks and capitalization omitted).
The government objects to this relief on two principal grounds. First, the government maintains that federal law, which, again, controls the priority of its liens here, does not allow the reinstatement of a discharged mortgage to a position of seniority over subsequently filed tax liens, regardless of whether state law would. Second, the government argues that, in any event, Green Tree has not demonstrated its entitlement to the equitable reinstatement of the mortgage under New Hampshire law. The court disagrees with the government's first point but agrees with its second point. As a result, Green Tree's motion for summary judgment must be denied.
IN RE: KRAUSE, Cite as 107 AFTR 2d 2011-XXXX
This was an appeal of a bankruptcy case where IRS liens were allowed against property transferred to a trust. I like some of the language which is why I am sharing some of it.
Can a taxpayer avoid the IRS by moving money to a “diet cookie” company and then destroying records that might show the company to be a sham? Or by transferring assets to his “children's trusts” only to use the trusts to pay for his country club membership, buy cars, and fund his lifestyle? The answer, of course, is no. Why this is so takes a bit more explanation.
To determine whether a conveyance is fraudulent and so void as a matter of state law, Kansas law directs us to look for “six badges or indicia of fraud”: “(1) a relationship between the grantor and grantee; (2) the grantee's knowledge of litigation against the grantor; (3) insolvency of the grantor; (4) a belief on the grantee's part that the contract was the grantor's last asset subject to a Kansas execution; (5) inadequacy of consideration; and (6) consummation of the transaction contrary to normal business procedures.” Koch Eng'g Co. v. Faulconer, 716 P.2d 180, 184 (Kan. 1986) (internal quotation omitted).
Mr. Krause wears these badges boldly. In setting up the “children's trusts,” he transferred money first to his wife who, in turn, transferred them to the trusts, all for no consideration. Mr. Krause also transferred various insurance policies to the trusts, again for no consideration. Each of these transfers took place after Mr. Krause knew the IRS was conducting an audit of his taxes and after the IRS issued a notice disallowing certain of his claimed losses. And while Mr. Krause's brother, Richard, served as trustee for the children's trusts, both he and Mrs. Krause have admitted that Mr. Krause controlled the assets in question at all times. Indeed, Mr. Krause maintained no personal bank account after 2000 but instead used the children's trusts to pay for his country-club memberships, car loans, and other personal expenses. And Mr. Krause did all this without objection from Richard, who candidly described his philosophy toward the trusts as “stick your head in the sand and then you don't know what is going on.” Aplt's App. vol. 1, at 300. In light of these remarkable and undisputed facts, badges of fraud all, it is plain that Mr. Krause remained the owner of the transferred assets; that the children's trusts held those assets simply as his nominees; and that those assets are subject to attachment by Mr. Krause's creditors under Kansas law.See also William D. Elliott, Federal Tax Collections, Liens and Levies ¶ 9.10[1] (2d ed. 2000) (“The subject of nominee liens refers to situations when taxpayer's property or rights to property is held in the name of another or transferred to another party.”).
U.S. v. SIMMONS, Cite as 107 AFTR 2d 2011-XXXX
This one has a really impressive number.
Joyce M. Simmons appeals the sentence imposed following her guilty plea conviction for six counts of preparation of false tax returns. The district court sentenced Simmons to the statutory maximum sentence of three years of imprisonment on each count, and it ordered that the sentences would run consecutively for a total of 216 months. It also ordered Simmons to pay $28,261,295.08 in restitution to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
The evidence in the pre-sentence report (PSR) and the testimony of IRS Agent Shannon Dawson established the method by which the estimated tax loss was calculated. While Simmons correctly states that the forty-one tax returns investigated by Agent Dawson were not a completely random sample, the record does not indicate that those returns would have a higher falsity rate than any other returns prepared by Simmons. Moreover, the PSR correctly noted that Agent Dawson's calculation was conservative because she used the lower of two reasonable falsity percentages that she calculated from the investigated sample, and she did not include any tax loss from approximately 3,000 tax returns prepared by Simmons that did not include a Schedule C.
Simmons next argues that the district court erred by applying an enhancement for her utilizing sophisticated means during the offense. She contends that the means she utilized were not sophisticated and that an enhancement for use of a special skill pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 should not have applied because she received an enhancement for being in the business of preparing tax returns. She asserts that the enhancement was not appropriate because a sophisticated means enhancement was not applied in United States v. Poltonowicz, 353 F. App'x 690 [104 AFTR 2d 2009-7564] (3d Cir. 2009), even though the defendant in that tax preparation fraud case had previously worked as an analyst for the IRS criminal investigation division.
Other than that she was appealing the length of her sentence. While I sometimes find that stuff interesting I'm not going into it any further. I was disappointed that there was not more explanation of the scam that she was running.
Monday, May 9, 2011
Threaten to Go Bankrupt - That Will Really Scare Them
IN RE: MITCHELL, Cite as 107 AFTR 2d 2011-979
I sometimes think that many people believe that if you are couple of days late filing your tax return a SWAT team of armed IRS agents will surround your house. The enforcement mechanisms are much more creaky than that. It is possible to slide deeply into non-compliance and continue to live a normal life. After a while, you will just get used to it. You might think about cleaning up your act but you will be in a hole that is way too deep.
That is what happened with Larry Mitchell:
Between 1986 and early 2006, Mitchell was self-employed and worked for Kennon Parker as an independent contractor. Due to Mitchell's status as an independent contractor, Kennon Parker did not withhold payroll taxes from his commission checks, and Mitchell was responsible for remitting his outstanding federal income and employment taxes to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). Until 1998, Mitchell paid all federal taxes owed; however, on multiple occasions he fell behind in payments, which resulted in levy threats and repayment plans with the IRS.
Starting in 1998, Mitchell simply stopped filing tax returns and stopped paying his federal income taxes. Mitchell maintained this pattern of noncompliance for five years, until June 2003, when he filed late returns for 1998 through 2002. At the time Mitchell filed these late tax returns, he did not make any payments toward his past due taxes for 1998 through 2002. At trial, Mitchell testified that he did not pay his taxes from 1998 to 2002 because his living, business, and divorce expenses fully exhausted his income.
You are supposed to organize your life so that you are living on your after tax income. Once you are past a certain income level, though, your taxes may well be your largest expense. If you are going to cut back in that area, why not go all the way ?
Mitchell earned an annual adjusted gross income of over $100,000 from 1998 to 2002, with the exception of 2000 when he earned approximately $88,000. When asked at trial why he had not paid anything towards his past due taxes even though in 2001 he earned over $170,000, 6 Mitchell responded: “[i]t doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that I'm going to owe somewhere around [$]300,000 plus interest and penalties. So at that point, I haven't filed anything. I don't have [$]300,000. I don't want to open this up yet.” . Additionally, from 2003 to 2006, despite consistently earning an annual adjusted gross income over $175,000, Mitchell did not pay any amount towards his past due taxes for 1998 to 2002, with the exception of payments made in July and August of 2006 under his installment agreement with the IRS.
I have observed in a couple of posts including this one that there are two distinct areas of tax practice. The first is the determination of the correct tax. As an individual you start that ball rolling when you file form 1040. That is the beginning and the end of that process for most people. The IRS assesses the tax that you computed and you are done. It is possible that you will be audited and not like the result of the audit. You can then appeal within the IRS. If you still don't like the result you can then go to tax court or federal district court or the court of claims. If you don't like what they have to say there are appellate courts in the various "circuits" that the country is divided into. If you don't like what the appellate court has to say there is the US Supreme Court, but they don't hear too many tax cases. Once that determination process is complete what happens if you don't pay ?
Do they throw you in jail ? Well, actually that is possible. There is, in fact, a third area of tax practice, that I don't get involved in at all. Jack Townsend has a very nice blog on the subject with the self-explanatory title of Federal Tax Crimes. Putting that aside, the second area of tax practice is collections. For most people that process begins and ends by them making a timely payment of the assessed tax. Instead you can do nothing and at some point the IRS will start the ball rolling or you can start it yourself by filing an Offer in Compromise. If the IRS has started the ball by sending you a notice of intent to levy your property you can file Request for a Collection Due Process or Equivalent Hearing. Although you can raise "doubt as to liability", generally there is no dispute about the correct tax at this point. It is all about your ability to pay.
Mr. Mitchell and his attorney worked the collection system to the max with three offers in compromise and an installment agreement that was in effect for a while. It is not my normal area of practice but I think they may have pushed it just a little beyond the envelope:
Mitchell's attorney sent a letter on November 12, 2004 to the IRS, which warned:
[I]n determining what is in the best interest of the IRS, the Service should look at reasonable collection potential ... due to the fact that the taxpayer could file bankruptcy against all of the non-payroll taxes except 2002 and 2003 (and could do so against 2002 in April, 2006, and against 2003 in April, 2007).
It reminds me of a story one of my college classmates told me. He and another Air Force attorney were at a base discussing a case with opposing counsel, who was encouraging them to settle because the expenses of the case, which the governent might have to bear depending on the outcome, could be quite high since depositions would have to be taken here there and everywhere. At that moment a fighter jet took off. My friend, who had been an electronics weapons officer before the Air Force sent him to law school, pointed to the quickly receding plane and said:
"You see that plane that just took off. It's going to use $20,000 worth of fuel before it lands. Are you really telling me that your firm is going to outspend the United States Air Force ?"
Threaten bankruptcy. I'm sure that's going to have the IRS collection guys just shaking in their boots. "Bankruptcy - Oh My God. We never thought of that. We could have had an armed escort at this meeting, but bankruptcy never entered our mind. We better settle."
The letter from the attorney did serve a purpose - to the government. It was not picked up by the trial court which discharged his tax indebtedness, but the appellate court took note of it:
Third, in November of 2004 while the third offer in compromise was pending, Mitchell's attorney sent a letter to the IRS warning that Mitchell “could file bankruptcy against all of the non-payroll taxes except 2002 and 2003 (and could so against 2002 in April, 2006, and against 2003 in April, 2007).” In other words, if the IRS refused to accept Mitchell's third offer in compromise of $35,000 for over $200,000 in tax debts, Mitchell would file bankruptcy and discharge his tax debts. Although the bankruptcy court had this letter in its possession, it apparently overlooked the paragraph in which Mitchell's attorney made this threat, and therefore it did not consider the letter as evidence of Mitchell's willfulness.
The appleate court did consider it evidence of willfulness.
So Mr. Mitchell still owes the taxes:
The bankruptcy court clearly erred in its finding that Mitchell did not act with the requisite mental state to satisfy the discharge exception of § 523(a)(1)(C). Accordingly, we REVERSE the decision of the district court and hold that Mitchell's tax debts for 1998 to 2002 fall within the scope of the § 523(a)(1)(C) exception, and therefore, such tax debts are not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
I sometimes think that many people believe that if you are couple of days late filing your tax return a SWAT team of armed IRS agents will surround your house. The enforcement mechanisms are much more creaky than that. It is possible to slide deeply into non-compliance and continue to live a normal life. After a while, you will just get used to it. You might think about cleaning up your act but you will be in a hole that is way too deep.
That is what happened with Larry Mitchell:
Between 1986 and early 2006, Mitchell was self-employed and worked for Kennon Parker as an independent contractor. Due to Mitchell's status as an independent contractor, Kennon Parker did not withhold payroll taxes from his commission checks, and Mitchell was responsible for remitting his outstanding federal income and employment taxes to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). Until 1998, Mitchell paid all federal taxes owed; however, on multiple occasions he fell behind in payments, which resulted in levy threats and repayment plans with the IRS.
Starting in 1998, Mitchell simply stopped filing tax returns and stopped paying his federal income taxes. Mitchell maintained this pattern of noncompliance for five years, until June 2003, when he filed late returns for 1998 through 2002. At the time Mitchell filed these late tax returns, he did not make any payments toward his past due taxes for 1998 through 2002. At trial, Mitchell testified that he did not pay his taxes from 1998 to 2002 because his living, business, and divorce expenses fully exhausted his income.
You are supposed to organize your life so that you are living on your after tax income. Once you are past a certain income level, though, your taxes may well be your largest expense. If you are going to cut back in that area, why not go all the way ?
Mitchell earned an annual adjusted gross income of over $100,000 from 1998 to 2002, with the exception of 2000 when he earned approximately $88,000. When asked at trial why he had not paid anything towards his past due taxes even though in 2001 he earned over $170,000, 6 Mitchell responded: “[i]t doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that I'm going to owe somewhere around [$]300,000 plus interest and penalties. So at that point, I haven't filed anything. I don't have [$]300,000. I don't want to open this up yet.” . Additionally, from 2003 to 2006, despite consistently earning an annual adjusted gross income over $175,000, Mitchell did not pay any amount towards his past due taxes for 1998 to 2002, with the exception of payments made in July and August of 2006 under his installment agreement with the IRS.
I have observed in a couple of posts including this one that there are two distinct areas of tax practice. The first is the determination of the correct tax. As an individual you start that ball rolling when you file form 1040. That is the beginning and the end of that process for most people. The IRS assesses the tax that you computed and you are done. It is possible that you will be audited and not like the result of the audit. You can then appeal within the IRS. If you still don't like the result you can then go to tax court or federal district court or the court of claims. If you don't like what they have to say there are appellate courts in the various "circuits" that the country is divided into. If you don't like what the appellate court has to say there is the US Supreme Court, but they don't hear too many tax cases. Once that determination process is complete what happens if you don't pay ?
Do they throw you in jail ? Well, actually that is possible. There is, in fact, a third area of tax practice, that I don't get involved in at all. Jack Townsend has a very nice blog on the subject with the self-explanatory title of Federal Tax Crimes. Putting that aside, the second area of tax practice is collections. For most people that process begins and ends by them making a timely payment of the assessed tax. Instead you can do nothing and at some point the IRS will start the ball rolling or you can start it yourself by filing an Offer in Compromise. If the IRS has started the ball by sending you a notice of intent to levy your property you can file Request for a Collection Due Process or Equivalent Hearing. Although you can raise "doubt as to liability", generally there is no dispute about the correct tax at this point. It is all about your ability to pay.
Mr. Mitchell and his attorney worked the collection system to the max with three offers in compromise and an installment agreement that was in effect for a while. It is not my normal area of practice but I think they may have pushed it just a little beyond the envelope:
Mitchell's attorney sent a letter on November 12, 2004 to the IRS, which warned:
[I]n determining what is in the best interest of the IRS, the Service should look at reasonable collection potential ... due to the fact that the taxpayer could file bankruptcy against all of the non-payroll taxes except 2002 and 2003 (and could do so against 2002 in April, 2006, and against 2003 in April, 2007).
It reminds me of a story one of my college classmates told me. He and another Air Force attorney were at a base discussing a case with opposing counsel, who was encouraging them to settle because the expenses of the case, which the governent might have to bear depending on the outcome, could be quite high since depositions would have to be taken here there and everywhere. At that moment a fighter jet took off. My friend, who had been an electronics weapons officer before the Air Force sent him to law school, pointed to the quickly receding plane and said:
"You see that plane that just took off. It's going to use $20,000 worth of fuel before it lands. Are you really telling me that your firm is going to outspend the United States Air Force ?"
Threaten bankruptcy. I'm sure that's going to have the IRS collection guys just shaking in their boots. "Bankruptcy - Oh My God. We never thought of that. We could have had an armed escort at this meeting, but bankruptcy never entered our mind. We better settle."
The letter from the attorney did serve a purpose - to the government. It was not picked up by the trial court which discharged his tax indebtedness, but the appellate court took note of it:
Third, in November of 2004 while the third offer in compromise was pending, Mitchell's attorney sent a letter to the IRS warning that Mitchell “could file bankruptcy against all of the non-payroll taxes except 2002 and 2003 (and could so against 2002 in April, 2006, and against 2003 in April, 2007).” In other words, if the IRS refused to accept Mitchell's third offer in compromise of $35,000 for over $200,000 in tax debts, Mitchell would file bankruptcy and discharge his tax debts. Although the bankruptcy court had this letter in its possession, it apparently overlooked the paragraph in which Mitchell's attorney made this threat, and therefore it did not consider the letter as evidence of Mitchell's willfulness.
The appleate court did consider it evidence of willfulness.
So Mr. Mitchell still owes the taxes:
The bankruptcy court clearly erred in its finding that Mitchell did not act with the requisite mental state to satisfy the discharge exception of § 523(a)(1)(C). Accordingly, we REVERSE the decision of the district court and hold that Mitchell's tax debts for 1998 to 2002 fall within the scope of the § 523(a)(1)(C) exception, and therefore, such tax debts are not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
Monday, October 4, 2010
The Mills of the Gods Grind Slowly
IN RE: BRYEN, Cite as 106 AFTR 2d 2010-5835, 08/13/2010
There are a number of sayings that I have accumulated over the course of my business career. Some I have even coined myself. An example of the latter is what I perceived to be the essence of business wisdom that my first managing partner, a second generation CPA, had distilled from perhaps a century of family public accounting experience (counting his father and his brother). "Money coming in is good. Money going out is bad." In my callow youth, I thought of that as ironic.
A real favorite, which I did not coin, is the saying "It is better to be lucky than good." (There is a contra saying that states a strong positive correlation between luck and hard work). A corollary is the observation "There but for the grace of God, go I." (Joan Baez says "fortune", but I don't find that as poetic.) That is what I reflect on contemplating the fate of Bruce Bryen, a fellow CPA.
Like Mr. Bryen, I devoted a significant part of my early professional career to tax shelters. I was fortunate in two regards. The first was that the tax shelters that my firm was involved in were quite legitimate. Shelters were attacked on a variety of grounds, one of which was that there was not a real desire for an economic return exclusive of the tax benefits. The "for profit" requirement was, however, relaxed in the case of tax shelters designed to promote low income housing, since Congress wanted people to put money into low income housing without expecting to get large economic returns or any economic return at all as it often turned out. My other piece of luck, if you might call it that, was not making enough money prior to 1986 to be tempted to buy any of the things myself.
Mr. Bryen became involved with "employee leasing" shelters. This was a type that escaped my notice in what turned out to be the waning days of real tax shelters. I may not appreciate the fine points, but the deals worked something like this. A partnership borrowed money from an operating company. The partnership then hired all the people who worked for the operating company and leased them to the operating company. The lease payments were deferred and the partnership was on the cash basis. When the partnership switched to the accrual basis it adopted a four year spread. The thing about a shelter like this is that it was pure deferral. Real estate held out the promise of conversion. That is that the income when it turned around on you would be a capital gain. Regardless, Mr. Bryen and his father, also a CPA, did quite a few of these deals. The IRS ended up making a project out of it. Finally, in 1996 one test case was heard with the decision to be binding on over 120 cases. Bealor v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 730, 1996, as you might guess found that the employee leasing arrangement was a sham. Among the facts noted was that the original "loan" by the corporation to the partnership was handled by a check that never was introduced into the banking system.
So this is all ancient history. These were cases from 1980 - 1988. The particulars aren't all that interesting because there are several law changes that would kill these deals as shelters even if they were respected. That's not what this story is about.
What happened after the Bealor decision is where it gets interesting. Given this whole test case concept you would think that Mr. Bryn would have gotten a bill sometime in 1996 or maybe 1997. That's not what happened. Here's what happened :
Once the Bealor Decision was final, the Debtor knew that he would be subject to additional tax liability and that the IRS would send him notice of the amount the IRS believed that he owed. While the Debtor knew that he also would be subject to interest and penalties, he did not know, at that time, the precise amount of additional tax that ultimately would be assessed.
For approximately five (5) years after the Bealor Decision was issued in 1996, the Debtor did not receive any communication from the IRS regarding the specific amount of his additional tax liability.
On June 27, 2002, the parties' negotiations culminated in the Debtor signing three (3) stipulations with the IRS All three (3) stipulations stated that the Debtor owed taxes due to substantial underpayment attributable to tax motivated transactions.
The total tab tax and penalties was $2,808,444. Then they added the interest. That brought the total tab to $13,556,124.82. Mr. Bryen's total payments on this obligation were exactly 0. The court noted that in the years from 1996 to 2003 Mr. Bryen's income ranged from the mid sixties to as much as $190,000. In 2004, when he filed for bankruptcy his projected annual income was $125,000. He listed 23 million dollars in debts of which 19 million was due to the IRS. (I don't know how it got from 13 to 19. It probably doesn't matter).
The court describes Mr. Bryen's lifestyle during this period in what to me sounds like a critical tone. He spent as much as $25,000 on travel in some years and shared the expenses of a beach house owned by his girl friend, whom he subsequently married. They spent $5,000 on their wedding the cost being evenly split between them.
I have this real mental split about how I respond to amounts of money. I have a rule with my kids that they can't use the word "only" in conjunction with any sum of money greater than four dollars (My kids are 17 and 21, by the way). I've not had a particularly onerous life, but as a teenager living with my mother, I was technically below the poverty line. When I was in VISTA, I used to consider how many cans of tuna fish I had to be a significant portion of my net worth. To this day, I get a warm fuzzy feeling when I open the cabinet and see 10 or more cans of tuna fish. So I understand the perspective that sees Mr. Bryen living real high during that period. On the other hand I've lived in a business world not that far removed from Mr. Bryen's where an income of $150,000 might be referred to as a buck and a half. The court is criticizing Mr. Bryen because he didn't live a frugal lifestyle for the five years that the IRS spent dithering after they won the Bealor case. The thing is that you could have teamed up Suzie Orman and my mothers friend "Aunt" Melba, who would mix four cans of water with the frozen orange juice, to run Mr. Bryen's life while he was waiting for the hammer to fall and he might have been able to save up something like $300,000 or so. In which case he would have owed more than he could ever conceivably pay. Choosing instead to live a less than frugal lifestyle he ended up owing more than he could ever conceivably pay.
The court did not say how much of a payment would have made a difference, but since he paid nothing and lived high on the hog for those five years, his debt was not discharged in bankruptcy. I'd love to have some comments from people who work with collections as to how they think this drama will play out from here.
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